

***Europe's strategic autonomy
in a transatlantic context
at the turn of the centuries***



Sui iuris sed non separata sunt

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ADAM KRZYMOWSKI

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**EUROPE'S STRATEGIC AUTONOMY
IN A TRANSATLANTIC CONTEXT
AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURIES**

Title of the Polish original *Stany Zjednoczone Ameryki Północnej
w procesie budowy europejskiej autonomii strategicznej
(1945-2001)*

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INTRODUCTION

With the Cold War over, many political scientists and politicians proclaimed the end of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). This alliance in nearly forty years played a crucial role in opposing the military strength of the Soviet Union. There were also opinions expressing the importance of the existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation as a platform for cooperation in the field of transatlantic security, demanding NATO's adaptation to new tasks beyond the traditional role of defending the territory of the member states. The end of the 20th century is a period of rapid changes in the international environment and the adaptation of the North Atlantic Alliance to new challenges. In the 1990s, it has happened some types of 'vacuum' and tensions in Western Europe - the United States of America relations. It arose from structural changes in the international system, and in turn, it had a significant impact on transatlantic security relations.

The 21st century began with the largest terrorist attack in history, of which the only superpower became a victim. September 11, 2001, affected U.S. foreign policy, transatlantic relations, the North Atlantic Alliance, and the European Union. The main goal of the United States of America was to shape an international situation in which no force would oppose or threaten its priority interests. Thus, they implemented a security strategy, the main elements of which were to guarantee the behaviour and actions of key actors in the international scene, following the long-term interests of the United States of America.

The United States of America's power and its decisions still have a significant impact on the world. In turn, the successes, problems, and challenges of integrating Europe also have global

implications. The right relations between the United States of America and its European allies have become a crucial task. However, the United States of America strives for its allies to support their activities in the international environment, not only. But also to legitimize their actions. Both within and outside of U.S. forces area responsibility stationed in Europe are invaluable 'assets' shaping behaviour and expectations in the region and responding to challenges in Europe and beyond. The transatlantic community should cover the whole of Europe, its various institutions, and spheres of activity necessary to deepen cooperation. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Union are the main pillars of this community. Americans and Europeans must cooperate in strengthening cooperative security and economic and political relations with countries that for many reasons cannot become NATO or European Union members in the coming years. The additional efforts of Americans and Europeans will be particularly important for achieving stability and relations with the Russian Federation and ending the war in Ukraine. Access to these Euro-Atlantic structures is in the common interest of Europe and the United States of America.

In this book, the problem of European strategic autonomy is presented in a broad international context as part of a wider transatlantic project. The leaders of the North Atlantic Alliance member states at the Brussels Summit in January 1994 stressed that the European Security and Defence Identity would strengthen transatlantic ties. Thus, European strategic autonomy concerns not only purely military problems but also broader transatlantic relations. It can be a solid binder of the whole structure of relations between the USA and its European allies.

When writing this book, the original materials were primarily used. The documents come mainly from the collections

and archives of the United States of America administration and the United States Congress. These were primarily reports, analyses, and statements from the White House, the State Department, the United States Representation to NATO, the United States Representation to the EU, the Department of Defence, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the United States European Command (EUCOM). In turn, the documents of the U.S. Congress mainly include resolutions, speeches, hearings, and opinions of individual congressmen, especially statements in the forum of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on European Affairs. The work was also based on analyses, studies, and articles of both American and European scientists, including Russian researchers. Important sources of documentation acquisition were: RAND Corporation, The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), International Institute for Strategic Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Geneva Center for Security Policy, Institute for European Policy, Centre d'Etudes Europeennes de Waterloo, The George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Harvard Center for European Studies, The Heritage Foundation, Austrian Diplomatic Academy, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, National Defense University in Washington (NDU), Netherlands Institute of International Relations, The American Enterprise Institute, Institute of USA and Canada.

The author's observations, and thoughts were obtained thanks to participation in many international meetings and conferences on transatlantic security, including NATO Headquarters, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). The author had the opportunity to participate in the discussion on Euro Atlantic strategic cooperation. In Paris, the

author, in turn, talked with representatives of the United States of America at NATO Headquarters, the Ministry of Defence of France, the EU Security Research Institute, and the chairman of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG). A valuable experience that the author used to write this book, were meetings with the American administration officials, representatives of European institutions, and individual countries at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London at the conference on September 12-14, 2001. It had special attention on global security. Consequently, the researcher used activities in other international discussions, among others, in Lisbon, St. Petersburg, Tallinn, Berlin, Paris, Toulouse.

This book consists of an introduction, four chapters, and a conclusion. The research layout reflects the nodal thematic complexes. The first chapter presents the efforts of the United States of America to secure leadership in the world and the attempts of some European countries to reduce American dominance on the European continent. The second chapter is devoted to the issue of the formation of new approaches by the American administration to NATO to safeguard its interests in Europe. The next, third chapter analyses the methods and means by which the United States of America has attempted to build its concept of ESDI, aiming to keep European allies under its protectorate. The subject of the fourth chapter is transatlantic relations after September 11, 2001. It showed the clear will of the United States of America to build a wider international anti-terrorist coalition and the impact of the events of September 11 on the process of building European strategic autonomy.

The period 2001 - 2015 deserves separate, in-depth analysis, i.e., from New York to Paris, from art. Art V of the Washington Treaty to art. 42 points 7 of the Treaty on European Union, as well as its further sequences. The discussion, actions, and

adoption of the European Global Strategy in 2016 will demonstrate the limited will of the EU Member States and the directions for strengthening the role and position of the European Union on the international stage. In terms of the global security architecture changes, transatlantic challenges, and European strategic autonomy, this will be demonstrated in the next book by the author.

Chapter 1

THE ROLE AND POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN EUROPE: 1945-1989

1. Hegemony

Before Western Europe began building European strategic autonomy, the United States of America secured the role of a hegemon. In 1945, President Truman said: 'Victory has burdened the American people with constant responsibility for managing the world.' In his State of the Union Address January in 1946, Truman proclaimed: 'We cannot shirk the responsibility that the position of the strongest state in the world imposes on us. All efforts, all endeavours, all the wisdom of our government and nation should be focused on accomplishing one task: to exert maximum influence on the development of international events.' Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, Arthur Vandenberg, emphasised: 'America should behave like number one world power - what it is. We should exercise moral leadership in the world, or the world will be left without leadership at all'.¹ Like President Wilson after the end of World War I, the United States of America at the end and after World War II sought to secure a leading position in the new international order.² This goal was supported by, among others, Marshall Plan, the UN, International Monetary Fund, and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

In spring 1947, between the Truman doctrine (March 12) and the Marshall Plan (June 5) proclamations, the convergence of American concepts, political, military, diplomatic, and economic activities became apparent. This time is, in fact, a turning point between the period of cooperation between the states within the

framework of the Grand Coalition and its breakup, leading to the Cold War, whose initiatives gave a strong impulse. Both acts were an expression of Washington's policy towards Europe and stimulated its division, which was already becoming increasingly clear. Truman's doctrine concerned the ideological and political plane concerning only two countries (Greece and Turkey). The Marshall Plan extended its operations to the economic plan and covered several countries, opening its markets to overproduction occurring in the United States of America. Thanks to the assistance provided, Washington also gained the opportunity to influence the political situation in Europe.

In 1949, the treaty on the North Atlantic Alliance was signed, which coupled American political and military strategy. At the root of Truman's doctrine was the strategy of containment developed by the U.S. Department of State, penned by George Kennan, a long-term diplomat in Moscow. It postulated to stop 'Russian expansive tendencies', which would require conducting policy 'from a position of strength'. In April 1947, Bernard Baruch, a supporter of consolidating the United States of America atomic monopoly with the United Nations, called it the 'Cold War'.³ Through its new 'containment' policy, the USA pursued a consistent policy of deterring the expansion of the USSR. This period is known as the Cold War. Because the two powers - although there was no direct military conflict between them - kept their countries ready for war. Both sides took numerous actions to demonstrate their will to defend their interests, such as the 1948 conflict in Berlin, during which Marshal Sokolowski decided to block access roads leading to the western zones of Berlin. In response to the Russian roadblock, the United States of America stayed in Berlin regardless of the costs and launched the 'air bridge'.⁴

When analysing methods that ensured American supremacy, it is worth revisiting pre-cold war factors. To conduct a more effective recognition and greater impact on the external environment, on June 13, 1942, the United States of America created an intelligence service in the form of the Office of Strategic Services. The first attempt to create a permanent intelligence institution was made in America in 1903. In practice, until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, the United States of America did not have efficient intelligence. The first head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was General William J. Donovan. In 1943, an OSS subordinate, Allen W. Dulles, conducted secret negotiations in Geneva with representatives of the Nazi Abwehr, which were not previously known. Berlin, which was a symbol of the Cold War, was also the centre of the intelligence war between the United States of America and the Eastern Bloc. Berlin, at the time, was primarily a place where strategic intelligence was deployed.⁵ The United States of America's intelligence presence began in July 1945. The first to come to Berlin were intelligence officers of the OSS. Donovan then headed the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) formed in place of OSS, which was established in January 1946.⁶ The latter, in turn, was replaced by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), set up on September 18, 1947,⁷ with Allen Dulles as a chairman.

In the same year, the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) concluded a secret agreement with the British counterpart in electronic intelligence - Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ). Initially, the agreement assumed cooperation at the level of 'classical' intelligence. The Canadian Communications Security Unit, the Australian Defence Signals Directorate (DSD), and the New Zealand Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) joined this secret

agreement the following year. Through these agreements, the United States of America has built an effective intelligence network to consolidate and strengthen its supremacy.

Like the nuclear program, American space research became a by-product of World War II and the answer to the achievements of German technology. The beginning of this research should be sought in Goddard's test flights in New Mexico, the Wright brothers' records on Kitty Hawk, and even earlier events. The decisive change in the quality of these tests was determined by the confirmation of the usefulness of the V-2 rockets. In January 1945, at the news of the approach of the Russians to the rocket launcher in Peenemünde, German rocket designers decided to flee to the West. In this way, the best specialists, together with complete technical documentation about Germany's previous successes and failures in rocket construction, came to the United States of America. In the same year 1945, as part of the operation code-named 'Paper Clip' ('Operation Paperclip'), the U.S. army transported the constructors and the documentation with the latest world achievements in the field of rocket construction and space penetration to U.S. military bases. Foreign scientists - this time fled not to Hitler's power, but the consequences of his defeat - were drawn to the list of American space research authors in which they played no less role than their colleagues in the work on the atom.⁸

In February 1945, at a time when the fate of the war was already sealed, a Yalta conference took place in Crimea, during which half of Europe was looted to Stalin. Before the Yalta conference, George Kennan proposed to conclude a final compromise [with the Soviet Union] - an open division of Europe into spheres of influence.⁹ It was a violation of the principles adopted in the Atlantic Charter and a failure to meet

obligations towards Poland. Two months after the conference, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt died at his headquarters in Georgia. Roosevelt played a substantial role in shaping the post-war world. During a series of international conferences held under his auspices, plans were laid down for individual elements of the post-war global order: the precursor of the United Nations (in Dumbarton Oaks); the world financial system (at Bretton Woods); food and agriculture (in Hot Springs); assistance and reconstruction (in Washington) and civil aviation (in Chicago).¹⁰ After Roosevelt's death, Vice President Harry S. Truman took over the presidency. Truman was a professional party activist who was never interested in foreign policy. He became the vice president only thanks to the arrangements within the democratic party. By assuming the presidency, he adopted the concept of continuing the policy of his predecessor. Truman managed to organise a conference in San Francisco from April 25 - June 26, 1945, with representatives of forty-five countries, at which the United Nations (UN) was founded in New York. The establishment of the UN was a fulfillment of the intentions of Roosevelt, who claimed, followed by Truman, that the United States of America - the initiator and host of this organisation - would implement thanks to its ideas building post-war global order. Accordingly, in line with the interests of the United States of America, rules on monetary and financial matters were developed during the conference. The International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development were also created. Perhaps the most important principles for the interests of the United States of America have been adopted to determine the functioning of the world's monetary system. At Bretton Woods, it was established that gold would be pegged to the USA dollar at a rate of 35 per ounce, American currency would become the basis for calculating

foreign exchange rates. The United States of America has committed to maintaining the convertibility of its currency into gold. Thus, becoming the guarantor of the currency system stability in most countries in the world. It was the beginning of the U.S. hegemony planned by them, reflecting their internal system, based on the pluralism of both society and political life.¹¹ Thus, American supremacy, creating a new international order, has duplicated many features of the U.S. political system and gave it an institutional shape.

Director of the Office of War Mobilization James F. Byrnes, later Secretary of State, at the end of April 1945, recognised that the atomic bomb could put the United States of America in a situation where they could dictate its peace conditions at the end of the war,¹² a concept that impressed President Truman. In the desert of New Mexico near Alamogordo, that the U.S. conducted the first nuclear test. This successful attempt gave the Americans a chance to implement the words spoken by a colleague of President Truman about the possibility of dictating Europe and the world their concept of the post-war order. The United States of America was strong enough to shape the world according to its ideas seemed to be their destiny. Three weeks after the first nuclear test, in August 1945, the Americans dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The use of the atomic bomb was aimed not so much at speeding up the victory in the war (Germany had capitulated three months earlier), but it was - as previously stated by James F. Byrnes - a demonstration of strength to subjugate the other powers. This in turn contributed to the implementation of the American vision of Europe and the world. Former U.S. President Herbert Hoover said in a similar vein that thanks to having an atomic bomb, Americans will be able to impose their policies on the whole world, including

European allies. It is worth highlighting at this point because of the further considerations presented in this book.

By the end of the war, the United States of America was undoubtedly a global power that could effectively influence the fate of the world. This was expressed in the possession of enormous military and economic potential. More than half of the gross national product (GNP) of the world shortly after the end of the war. In the United States of America, there has been a remarkable development of new technologies. The huge cultural influence of the U.S. on other participants of international relations has been marked. Thus, Americans owe their supremacy mainly to the excellent organisation, the ability to quickly mobilise enormous economic and technological potential for military purposes, difficult to define but the clear cultural attractiveness of the American lifestyle, as well as the great dynamism and natural competitiveness of social and political elites.¹³

The United States of America secured its influence in Europe and the world through its conceptualization of the post-war world - institutions such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The Atlantic Alliance was established based on the Washington Treaty signed on April 4, 1949. Presented as a package of lofty ideals, then institutionalised in the form of NATO, it became an instrument for implementing American policy in Europe. The first members of the Alliance from Western Europe included: United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland. The establishment of the Alliance was an unprecedented event in the history of the American tradition of foreign policy. Until now, there was no room for military alliances in peacetime.¹⁴

The factor contributing to the accession of Western European countries to the Alliance was not only the will to defend against the aggression seen in the East. But also, the fact that the United States of America in Hiroshima and Nagasaki proved to the European powers that they could use force to implement their concept of the post-war world. The memory of that demonstration of strength and the awareness of the indisputable role of the superpower, which was already the U.S., meant that Western European countries preferred to be a vassal of the United States of America, rather stand with them, than against them.

2. The global role

The participation of the United States of America in World War II resulted in a change in the current rules of foreign policy. The starting point for the argument for U.S. global military involvement was the belief in the unique role of the United States of America and its broad global interests. As a result of World War II, the United States of America secured the conditions to play the indisputable role of global power. Alliances and military agreements, primarily from the 1940s and 1950s, contributed to the U.S. reign in all seas and oceans. It gained the ability to influence every corner of the world, due to its range and scale of hegemony.

The United States of America's military involvement on a global scale was also clearly supported by American industrial groups, especially defence companies, which achieved significant profits during the war. Because war and conflict are very lucrative for the arms industry, most companies were very keen to continue production. To this end, they supported the concept of post-war militarisation of states, which was to take

place under control and on the terms set out by the United States of America through alliances and military agreements. The U.S. administration and representatives of defence companies saw the possibility of achieving great economic and political profits and decided to use it. Creating a system of alliances and military agreements was also in the interest of American companies located abroad due to the role of the U.S. military units stationed there as a guarantor of the security of these companies.

Military alliances

Forming alliances is one of the fundamental instruments for achieving the goals of the country's foreign policy. Alliances contribute to the political, military, and economic power of the member states. The American system of alliances has been closely linked to the new world order.¹⁵ The U.S. superpower is based on an alliance system. Typical military alliances were multilateral blocks that could carry out politics on behalf of a given region. After the Second World War, the United States of America concluded four typical military alliances in the form of treaties. The first of these was the Rio Pact (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) established in 1947. This alliance gave the United States of America a legal basis for military intervention in the interests of U.S. companies operating in Latin America. Under the treaty signed on April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Alliance was created, which gave rise to a network of alliances and military agreements. The founders of this military bloc were the United States of America, Canada, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Iceland. On September 1, 1951, the United States of America signed a security pact with Australia and New Zealand, under which it formed the ANZUS alliance, whose name comes from the first letters of the names of

the Member States. ANZUS was directed against an ally from the North Atlantic Treaty – the United Kingdom, forcing it out of the region of its previous influence. Three years later, on September 8, 1954, under the Manila Pact, the Americans set up another military bloc in Southeast Asia. SEATO (South-East Asia Treaty Organisation) guaranteed the United States of America a leadership role in this region. This alliance assumed military cooperation between the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, New Zealand, Australia, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines.

It is also worth mentioning the military system formed in 1955 under the Baghdad Pact. The Middle East region was strategically important for the United States of America due to its energy resources. Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom became members of the alliance. Although the bloc was founded on an American initiative, the United States of America itself did not want to be its founding member, as its membership would unnecessarily emphasise the presence of the USA in this region. However, the Americans played a leadership role in the block, as they sat on the most important committee of the alliance - the military commission. In addition, the United States of America sent observers to each session.

In the system of alliances, the critical role was played by the North Atlantic Alliance. The NATO establishment, above all an instrument of American foreign policy, aimed at contributing to the North Atlantic Treaty under the 'cover' of the weapons unification has enabled the Americans to expand their arms markets. It united the richest and most influential Western European countries under American leadership. As a result, the Americans were able to interfere in the internal affairs of Western European countries. The military alliances' system has become the lever of the U.S. position and its role in Europe and

the world. It contributed to an international balance of power and entailed the implementation of the concept of 'spheres of influence'. Supporters of this concept were Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace, and diplomat George E. Kennan.¹⁶ This concept recognised that great powers have the right to rule their area of interest.

Military agreements

In addition to the multilateral agreements mentioned above constituting military alliances, the United States of America has concluded many bilateral military agreements. During World War II, when the United States Congress voted against joining the war, President Roosevelt token decisions on closer cooperation with other countries in preparation for American participation in the war and engagement in Europe. On September 6, 1940, the United States of America signed an agreement with the United Kingdom regarding the exchange of 50 destroyers in exchange for military bases. On April 9, 1941, it signed an agreement with the Danish government, under which it obtained the right to station American troops in Greenland.

Agreements regarding military assistance

Under the provisions of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) were implemented military assistance agreements. This initiative was adopted in 1949 during the meeting of the committee for military assistance to foreign countries. The program brought united individual aid projects and it foresaw the extension of military assistance to friendly countries.¹⁷ Additionally, military assistance agreements were based on the Economic Cooperation Act 1948, the Mutual Defence Assistance Act 1949, the Act for International Development 1950, the Mutual Defence Assistance Control Act 1951, and the Mutual

Security Act 1951. Agreements on military assistance were one of the American instruments. It allowed interference in the foreign and internal policies of beneficiary countries. As a result, political and military interests were intertwined with economic interests. The American industry benefited enormously from the development of military capabilities and the demand for new technologies. The supply of military equipment and training of the armed forces under military assistance agreements allowed the United States of America to act as a supervisor. They strengthened local armed forces, gave deep access to governmental institutions, their people, and military elites of a given country, and prevented such access by other countries. Agreements to achieve various political goals also allowed for supporting friendly governments and gaining public favour, strengthening the power and importance of a given country¹⁸ subordinated simultaneously to the United States of America. States, buying weapons or using U.S. military assistance in most cases had to invite American's military advisers, which also favoured the penetration of their armed forces and allowed them to influence. Besides, these countries have become dependent on the supply of spare parts and equipment maintenance. In other words, the United States of America bought 'political clients' when selling weapons or handing them over as part of military assistance.¹⁹

3. Europe's strategic autonomy

The building of a European security and defence system issue was raised just after World War II. From the very beginning, France held a different position towards the American defence concept of Europe. Initially focusing on jointly counteracting the rebirth of the aggressive military power of

Germany, on 4 March 1947 in Dunkirk, France with the United Kingdom signed an agreement on friendship and mutual assistance. After less than a month of negotiations, on March 17, 1948, the Brussels Treaty was signed in Brussels between the United Kingdom, France, and the Benelux countries on economic, social, and cultural cooperation and collective self-defence. This document was no longer purely anti-German. The possibility of using the alliance against another state or organisation recognised by the signatories as an aggressor was not excluded. It happened despite the explicit efforts of France that Germany was the only country whose aggression would constitute *casus foederis*.²⁰ The signing of the treaty triggered a positive U.S. response. On the same day, President Truman stated that the United States of America would explore all possibilities for joining the cooperation.²¹ It is worth pointing out that the so-called Vandenberg resolution of June 11, 1948, became the foundation for the future participation of Americans in regional and transatlantic collective security structures. Moreover, making the provision of economic assistance and security guarantees for Western Europe by the United States of America dependent on the readiness of Western Europe to create a political and military organisation.

The first post-war years were characterised by French scepticism about the American concept, among others resulting from 'soft' security guarantees provided by art. 5 of the Washington Treaty, and the dominant role of the United States of America in the North Atlantic Alliance. The election of July 25, 1950, in London during the first meeting of the NATO Council, representative of the United States of America in the Council, ambassador Charles M. Spofford, as permanent chairman and the appointment of General Dwight D. Eisenhower by the NATO First Chief on December 19, 1950, as Supreme Allied

Commander Europe (SACEUR), was also deemed controversial. Therefore, in October 1950, René Pleven, then the Prime Minister of France, proposed the concept of a united European army. This army was to be subordinated to the joint defence minister, responsible to the Directory of Ministers of Defence of the member countries, and a specially created Assembly consisting of representatives of national parliaments. The various bodies were to be closely modelled on the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The 'Pleven Plan' became the basis for signing the treaty on the creation of the European Defence Community (EDC). The rising tensions between East and West and the war in Korea caused the United States of America to offer Germany's remilitarisation as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. In this way, they wanted to strengthen the Alliance's military potential in the areas bordering the zone of Soviet influence. An important role in the birth of this project was played by the assessment of the potential possibilities of France, which was then strongly influenced by the communist party supported by 25% of the electorate and at the same time was involved in the war in Indochina. The struggle between the American and French concepts continued.

The end of 1950 is a period of consolidation of the North Atlantic Alliance as well as strengthening the role of the U.S. In April 1951, Marshal Montgomery handed over to General Eisenhower full power over NATO operational forces. The position of Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe has been reserved for Americans. On May 27, 1952, an agreement on the creation of a European Defence Community (EDC) was signed by France, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Italy. It was to establish integrated armed forces subordinated to a united European command and thus implement the concept of Prime Minister

René Pleven.²² However, it was an arrangement based on the American concept, assuming the loss of the right for the Member States to have its armed forces, except troops stationed in colonies or intended to maintain public order. EDC was to be strictly subordinated to NATO, which meant that the final vote on the use of a joint European army belonged to the United States of America.²³ Meanwhile, in France, EDC was attacked by opponents of the French army's subordination to the international, American - as argued - command, with the simultaneous remilitarisation of Germany. The ratification debate, undertaken by the French National Assembly after lengthy discussions, as it was only on August 29, 1954, eventually led to the rejection of the agreement, and thus the overthrow of the European Defence Community. Therefore, a conference was organised in Paris during which on October 23, 1954, the Modified Brussels Treaty was adopted. In addition to the first signatories of the Brussels Treaty, Italy and West Germany signed the treaty, agreeing the state of war with Germany was ended and full sovereignty restored with the right to have a half-million army.²⁴ Germany has imposed various restrictions in the field of arms. At the same time, 14 member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation decided on full membership of the Federal Republic of Germany in the North Atlantic Alliance, which formally took place on May 5, 1955. Under pressure from the United States of America and the United Kingdom, France ratified the Paris Agreements. It allowed Germany full membership to the Alliance. The treaty reflected the then reality dominated by the intensifying Cold War process and the end of the great anti-Hitler coalition. It contained a mandatory military assistance clause expressed in art. V: 'if one of the High Parties agreeing becomes the object of armed aggression in Europe, the others shall provide it, under Art. 51

UN Cards, assistance and support with all means in their possession, military and other'.²⁵ The treaty established a political consultative council and a permanent military committee obliged to prepare defence plans and coordinate command means, which testified to Western Europe's growing fear of the aggressive USSR policy and the emerging division of the world. It also established cooperation in the field of armaments and the principle of mutual trust. The Modified Brussels Treaty became the basis for the creation of the Western European Union. WEU, the only European collective self-defence organisation to date, however, become a tool for pursuing American interests in Europe by putting it under the full control of NATO's Article IV of the Modified Brussels Treaty. This article stated that during its implementation, the parties, and established bodies 'would closely cooperate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation' and in order not to duplicate the activities of NATO staffs, the WEU Council and Agency 'would ask the relevant NATO military authorities for all information and opinions on military matters'.²⁶

Thus, in a situation, the United States of America played a decisive role. The Western European Union became an 'annex' to the Atlantic Alliance, with virtually no autonomous defence competence or a common command structure guaranteeing the fulfilment of the duty of mutual assistance in the event of aggression resulting from Article V of the Brussels Treaty.²⁷ In the next decade, France attempted to push its competitive concept against the United States of America. General Charles de Gaulle, who in 1958 first became prime minister and then president, announced his goal in 1960: to contribute to the construction of Western Europe as a political, economic, cultural, and humanitarian grouping organized for action and defence progress. General de Gaulle was not a man who liked to follow

the paths set by others. He could accept the North Atlantic Alliance, but on condition that the commander-in-chief would be French.²⁸ He wanted a Europe that would remain under French leadership. At that time, however, the French had to devote a lot of strength to solving other problems of the successive governments of the fourth republic, especially Algerian affairs.

In 1960, in response to French intentions, U.S. President John F. Kennedy proposed a similar concept of a European pillar in the North Atlantic Alliance. In turn, on October 19, 1961, France, pursuing the goal set in 1960 by its president, presented the 'Draft Treaty concerning the establishment of the Union of European peoples', the so-called Fouchet's plan. It was an initiative serving France's pursuit of becoming a leading power in Europe, and ultimately to drive the United States of America out of its sphere of political influence achieved through the Alliance. France, in the Fouchet Plan, emphasised that it is the only continental nuclear power. The project envisaged the creation of an association of states which, under the leadership of France, would strengthen the security of the member states based on common defence policy.²⁹ The strength of the United States of America's influence on France's Western European partners was so influential that there was no implementation of the concept incompatible with U.S. interests. The creation of a European defence community independent of the North Atlantic Alliance would contribute to the United States of America losing its position as an empire influenced by the Alliance. Therefore, on January 8-20, 1962, NATO member states supported the idea of strengthening the Alliance and the Atlantic Community contained in the Paris Declaration.

President de Gaulle's failure to implement the French concept at the level of multilateral agreements has contributed to the search for solutions at the bilateral level. The president,

therefore, attempted to create a group of Western European countries with a defence organisation with its potential. Initially, in 1962, France signed an agreement with the United Kingdom on military cooperation, including nuclear cooperation, and then on January 22, 1963, the Élysée Treaty with Germany on friendship and cooperation. The struggle for a leadership role in Europe brought again the failure of the French concept that made Europe economically, politically, and militarily independent of the United States of America. The French then realized the path to victory was to over-take the American concept by full political integration of Western European countries. The French defeat was caused primarily by the will to maintain an integrated defence system with the United States of America by the European partners of France who were addicted to Washington's interests. On October 22-23, 1963, during military exercises codenamed 'Big Lift', 14,500 American soldiers were transported by air from the United States of America to Germany. The purpose of this action was to demonstrate the ability of the U.S. to rapidly strengthen NATO forces in Europe in the event of an emergency.

Considering France's isolation on the battlefield with the implementation of the American concept, President Charles de Gaulle announced during a press conference on September 9, 1965, that France would leave the military structures of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. On March 10, 1966, the French president officially announced his intention to withdraw from the integrated NATO military structure. On June 30, 1966, France officially left NATO's integrated military structure, remaining only a member of its political structures. As a result, the French influence on the functioning of the Alliance was limited. On December 3-4, 1970, a joint ministerial meeting of the Council and Defence Planning Committee was held in Brussels, at which

the United States of America announced that it did not intend to reduce its military presence in Europe.³⁰ Four years later, in Brussels, a controversial statement by Kissinger appeared: Are Europeans confident that the USA will use ballistic missiles to defend Europe? During the EEC summit, held in Paris on October 9, 1974, a European Council was formed, consisting of heads of government and member states of the European Economic Community, which later became the main body of the European Political Community. It was also announced that the scope of the EPC would be extended to all foreign policy areas concerning the interests of the European Communities. In the same year the European Council was granted UN observer status and during the Belgian Presidency the so-called Troika (current, previous, and the future country holding EPC presidency).

At the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, Europeans' voices rose again regarding European strategic autonomy, seeking their security guarantees. The impetus for resuming efforts in this respect was the adoption on December 12, 1979, at a special meeting of NATO foreign and defence ministers in Brussels on the preparation for the implementation of the so-called double decision. One assumed rearmament of Western Europe with American medium-range weapons; the other (which is dissatisfied by Europeans), the possibility of differentiating the sensitivity of the USA and Western European theatre to a possible USSR attack.³¹ The second decision was related to the American work on building a shield of its territory from space. This initiative was formally announced in 1983 in the form of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI).

For the first time, security issues were included in the scope of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the London Report of October 13, 1981. This is important because up until now, the EPC - with the tacit consent of its participants - did not include

security and defence policy (it was an unwritten agreement of EC member states not to violate NATO competencies). The Report emphasised the obligation to consult and specified the EPC's relations with third countries and the European Parliament. The task of the Report was also to create mechanisms that would not delay the EPC's response to international problems (e.g., convening meetings of foreign ministers at the request of at least three countries within 48 hours).³² At the beginning of 1981, the Vice-Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany Hans-Dietrich Genscher proposed to clarify the European idea for a stronger connection between the European Council and the EPC. Moreover, to integrate security policy into European Political Cooperation. On June 19, 1983, Stuttgart, the European Council adopted the Stuttgart Declaration on the European Union.³³ It concluded the 'coordination of Member States' positions in the political and economic aspects of security policy'. In its memorandum of February 1984, France proposed to renew the Western European Union, allowing it to be adapted to the new international situation.

On October 26-27, 1984, in Rome, WEU Ministerial Council accepted the Rome Declaration with the annex regarding institutional reform. On the one hand, the Rome Declaration contained political decisions aimed at maintaining the existence of the WEU, on the other hand - it talked about the institutional reform of this organisation. Member States underlined the importance of the Modified Brussels Treaty. They declared the support concerning the objectives they set forth, which served to strengthen peace and security in general, build unity and gradually strengthen European integration and develop closer cooperation between WEU countries and other European organisations. The text of the Declaration confirmed the 'growing need to strengthen Western security' and - considering

the specific interests of the signatory states - called for 'a better use of the Western European Union framework to deepen cooperation between the Member States in the field of security policy'. The declaration also confirmed WEU's relations with NATO, which remain the foundation of European security. From this perspective, better use of the Western European Union would not only serve Western European security. But also improve the system of joint defence of all countries participating in the Atlantic Alliance. The document signed in Rome underlined that the WEU Council, and in particular the Council of Ministers, would consider the possibility of agreeing on a common position of its members regarding security problems in Europe, such as:

- defence,
- arms control and disarmament,
- the impact of East-West relations on European security,
- Europe's participation in strengthening NATO, considering the special importance of transatlantic ties,
- developing European cooperation in the field of arms, which the WEU can give political impetus.

At the same time, the WEU Council could - following the Declaration - deal with the consequences of crises not only in Europe but also in other regions of the world.³⁴ The text of the Roman document indicates the importance of the WEU Assembly, 'which, as the only European parliamentary body, was treaty authorized to discuss defence problems and is called to play an increasingly important role'. The document was supplemented by an annex describing institutional reforms that would have to be implemented to adapt the Western European Union to new tasks. However, one of the tangible results of the arrangements adopted in Rome was the restoration of regular WEU Council meetings (twice a year at the ministerial level).

Foreign and defence ministers were to participate in these meetings, together or separately. The participation of defence ministers in the work of the Council was a result of strong insistence on the part of the WEU Assembly.³⁵

In 1985, the European Strategic Group (Le Groupe Stratégique Européenne - GSE) was founded, financed from private sources. The purpose of its creation was to facilitate and coordinate studies in the field of defence of Western European countries, particularly at a multinational level. GSE brought together specialists from many fields of science and various national research institutions. The European Strategic Group included: the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, the French Institute of International Affairs in Paris (IFRI), the Institute of International Affairs in Rome (IAI), two German institutes of international affairs in Bonn, the Dutch Institute of International Affairs in Clingendael, the Institute for Strategic and International Studies of Lisbon (IEEI) and the WEU Institute for Security Studies. Six countries in total participated in the work of GSE: France, the Netherlands, Germany, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and Italy. European Strategic Group's work was reflected in the speeches of many leading European politicians.³⁶

On February 17, 1986, the Single European Act (SEA) was signed. The Single European Act, which entered into force on July 1, 1987, gave the formal and legal basis for the functioning of the EPC.³⁷ The document highlights the role that the United States of America and its nuclear and conventional forces play in European security. While France had great hopes for the Single European Act, the SEA's provisions regarding security issues were postulated. The view was expressed that closer cooperation in the field of European security would significantly contribute to the development of European identity in foreign policy matters.

EC states emphasised that they are ready to closely coordinate their positions in political and economic aspects of security, with the proviso that the adopted arrangements do not violate the obligations of certain EC states that belong to the Western European Union or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

The fundamental breakthrough in the process of shaping the institutional framework for political cooperation and in the field of security of the EC states falls only at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. In the Hague, on October 27, 1987, a document called 'Platform on European Security Interests' (the Hague Platform) was adopted. The Platform's purpose was to define the conditions and criteria for the interests and obligations which arise for WEU members on Western defence, arms control, and dialogue with the East. In the introduction, reference was made to the involvement of the countries forming the Western European Union in the construction of the European Union announced in the Single European Act. The signatories expressed their conviction that the unification of Europe, implemented following the Single European Act, based on the EEC's economic and political foundations, would remain incomplete without considering the defence dimension. In this context, the role of the revived Western European Union and the importance of this organisation for the entire European integration process should have been seen at that time. The continued commitment of the WEU Assembly, the only European parliamentary body authorised by the Treaty to consider 'all aspects of security, including defence issues', was underlined.

The Hague Platform contains an assessment of the situation in the field of international security. It stated no signs of limiting the armaments effort on the part of the USSR. Western Europe, however, by its geostrategic location was a sensitive area for the

core of conventional, chemical, and nuclear forces of the Warsaw Pact. WEU states have expressed a concern caused by the ability of the forces subject to the USSR to launch a surprise massive attack that could quickly overtake the entire continent. Therefore, the signatories of the Hague Platform recognised that 'the security of Western European countries can only be ensured by close relations with the United States of America allies within the NATO, in which the security of member states is indivisible'. It was stated that 'the significant presence of U.S. conventional and nuclear forces plays an irreplaceable role in defending Europe. This is concrete evidence of American involvement in European security and creates the necessary link with U.S. strategic deterrence forces. The Hague document confirmed the commitment under Article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty on the readiness of the Western European Union to defend all Member States in the event of armed attack. At the same time, the organisation's participation in arms control and the disarmament process was emphasised by using the 'CSCE process to develop global cooperation between participating countries.³⁸

After the Regan - Gorbachev summit, in 1986, Europeans received a signal that they may be deprived of the main part of the American umbrella, consisting of medium and short-range missiles. At the time, the situation in the Mediterranean strengthened their urgency to secure their security solutions. On December 11, 1987, at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the United States of America responded to the adopted Hague Platform. The U.S. response was not too enthusiastic. Despite this, the North Atlantic Council positively accepted the content of the Hague Platform, confirming 'the existence of identity in the field of European security in the Atlantic Alliance,

encouraging the strengthening of transatlantic ties and the consolidation of the Alliance as a whole'.³⁹

In sum, one should agree with Mark Whitakerem's statement that the United States of America is leading, and its allies are following. This is multilateralism in the edition of NATO, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, in which the U.S. pays bills and plays the first violin. The allies' task is to stabilise the international situation in individual regions and support the U.S. in both peace missions and military operations. The balance of power in the world marks the United States of America a special place in the international community. They occur internationally as a *primus inter pares*.⁴⁰ Despite the consolidation of Western European countries in the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance under the leadership of the United States of America during the Cold War, Western Europeans 'from the beginning' had the desire to create their security guarantees. It resulted from the provision of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which does not provide obligatory military assistance. This article states that: 'The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in the exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area'.⁴¹ Thus, Western European countries were concerned that the United States of America would treat the North Atlantic Alliance mainly as an instrument of American foreign policy. Without the obligation to provide automatic

assistance to European allies. After all, the collapse of the block system and the initial isolationist tendencies in the United States of America, and the shift of American attention to the Pacific region meant that Western Europe in its integration process began to take seriously the need to build its independent security policy. However, the United States of America quickly recognised that it was in its interest to use the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation as a tool for European integration.⁴²

Notes

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² See: J. Kiwerska, *Między izolacjonizmem a zaangażowaniem. Europa w polityce Stanów Zjednoczonych od Willsona do Roosevelta*, Poznań 1999, p. 43.

³ J. Kukułka, *Historia Współczesna Stosunków Międzynarodowych*, Warszawa 1998, p. 40.

⁴ J.J. Harrigan, *Politics and the American Future*, New York 1986, p. 414.

⁵ Intelligence that is required to create military policies and plans at state and international levels.

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⁷ P. Schweizer, *Victory czyli zwycięstwo*, Warszawa 1994, p. 15.

⁸ D.J. Boorstin, *Amerykanie – fenomen demokracji*, Warszawa 1995, p. 564.

⁹ See: Ch. Bohlen, *Witness to History*, New York 1973, p. 45.

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- ²² A. Ciupiński, *Perspektywy europejskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa i obrony*, Studia i Materiały BPI MON No 43, Warszawa 1997, pp. 11-12.
- ²³ F.S.C. Northrop, *European Union, and the United States Foreign Policy*, New York 1954, p. 55.
- ²⁴ W. Waszczykowski, *Bezpieczeństwo europejskie: wspólna koncepcja 27 państw UZE*, Studia i Materiały BPI MON no 36, Warszawa 1996, p. 5.
- ²⁵ *Modified Brussels Treaty, Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence* signed at Brussels on March 17, 1948, as Amended by the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty, Signed in Paris on October 23, 1954.
- ²⁶ *Modified Brussels Treaty, Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence* signed at Brussels on March 17, 1948, as Amended by the 'Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty' signed at Paris on October 23, 1954.
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Chapter 2

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AFTER 1989

The perception of the role of the North Atlantic Alliance by the United States of America has changed depending on the international situation, especially East-West relations. The USA response to international volatility was the political, structural, military, and financial adaptation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. After 1989, the concept of the Euro-Atlantic security mechanism has undergone a deep evolution since the end of the Cold War block division of Europe. It was then carried out primarily in the adaptation of the North Atlantic Alliance forces to construct the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and European strategic autonomy. All this is done against the backdrop of changes in the international environment, arms reduction, and entering new qualitative relations between the United States of America and the European Community in the context of its integration and attempts to build autonomous defence capabilities.

On May 29-30, 1989, the North Atlantic Council adopted the Brussels Declaration. It included the expansion of cooperation with the East while solving global problems.¹ On July 6, 1990, during the London summit, the United States of America with NATO allies in the German unification situation and the initiation of transformation processes in the entire Eastern Bloc issued the London Declaration on the transformation of the North Atlantic Alliance. It was stated that 'NATO must become an institution in which Europeans, Canadians, and Americans work not only in the common defence. But also, to build a partnership with all European

countries. The declaration also says that the Atlantic Community must turn to the Eastern countries that were its opponents in the Cold War and extend a hand of friendship to them.² The next step for the Alliance was to adopt the concept of 'indivisibility of international security' throughout Europe, as expressed in the Copenhagen Declaration of June 1991; a breakthrough in East-West relations. The position explicitly stated that the security of NATO countries is inextricably linked to the security of all other European countries. Given the increasingly clear vacuum in security matters in the eastern part of the 'Old Continent', the United States of America took over the initiative in this regard.³

1. Revalued strategy of the United States of America

The end of the Cold War period deprived the United States of America and Europe of strategic harmony. Political polemics began to move in far more different directions than before.⁴ During the period of the rapid collapse of the block system, questions began to be raised about the role of the North Atlantic Alliance in the new environment. Representatives of the main theoretical currents in the science of international relations have also joined the debate. On the wave of optimistic, even naïve, forecasts promoted by American supporters of the neoliberal school in the science of international relations, the view was announced about the era of lasting peace. It guarantees to expand the influence of liberal ideology and build democratic political systems after the fall of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes in the eastern part of Europe and other regions of the world. As a result, the theses of neorealists (structural realism) were rejected, who - by forecasting the persistence of rivalry between powers and a return to the struggle for spheres of influence - advocated the Alliance's usefulness also in the post-Cold War era.

American researchers referring to neoliberal theses pointed out that the disappearance of the NATO opponent from the Cold War division calls into question the sense of the Alliance's continued existence, and if it is to survive, it should transform into a 'civil community.' Their theory of the interdependence of peace and democracy led to the thesis that NATO is not only an alliance to ensure joint defence, but a community of values shared by signatories. In turn, American neorealists believed that in international relations the representation of clearly defined national interests by states is decisive. They warned that if the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation took on new functions, it would not survive.⁵ Soon, however, both in the U.S. and among their Western European allies won the view of the need to maintain the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

On the eve of the agreement, signed on April 5, 1989, in Warsaw by the government and the opposition, on political reforms in Poland, and the 40th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the Bush administration underlined: 'Today is a changing world our Alliance not only maintains peace and freedom in the Atlantic world. But also, can make a joint effort to build more constructive relations with the East. Europe is entering a period of unprecedented change and great hopes. Without our moral and political unity, it would never have happened in the past four decades'.⁶ The United States of America announced the desire to use the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to build a new Europe. The collapse of the 'old order', built during the Cold War and the competition of superpowers, provided the United States of America new an opportunity in the creation of a 'new order' in Europe, and maintain the leading role of the U.S. on the 'Old Continent'. President George Bush soon announced the concept of a 'New Europe', based on an 'undivided and free' Europe. While in

Warsaw on July 9, 1989, President Bush remarked: 'Here, in the heart of Europe, American citizens fervently wish all and a free Europe'.⁷ During Bush's stay in Paris, he was asked a question about the concept of a whole and free Europe. Through this question, it was sought to equate the idea of Bush with the Gorbachev concept of a joint European home. President Bush replied that all and free Europe is a Euro-Atlantic concept. It is a broader concept, emphasising human rights and greater openness. It also means the United States of America's support of perestroika and changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.⁸

On October 11, 1989, President Bush met with NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner. Both leaders discussed various Alliance problems and analysed the course of events in Eastern Europe. President Bush pointed out that the Declaration of the May Summit of the Alliance set a new NATO course during the period of changes in East-West relations, entrusting the Alliance with the mission of overcoming the division of Europe. The president also expressed his strong support for the economic and political reforms in Poland and Hungary.⁹ On December 4, 1989, during the NATO summit in Brussels, President Bush stated that the most important task for the future of Europe is to overcome the division of Europe by guaranteeing freedom, emphasising that the United States of America has never accepted the division of Europe. In his opinion, the European Community cannot bear the burden of unifying Europe alone. The United States of America will stand by the Community in this noble effort. They relate to Europe through common values, democratic institutions, and joint interests. Therefore, mutual relations should be improved. Also, President Bush has announced that the USA will leave significant military forces in Europe if its allies desire the U.S. presence as part of a

joint security effort. The United States of America will remain a strategic force in Europe, and the USA would continue to be involved in the future of Europe and joint defence. Bush also presented the concept of New Atlanticism, which he defined as the concept of New Europe. According to Bush, Europe is changing and will change fundamentally. The transatlantic partnership can create the architecture of New Europe and New Atlantis, in which strong and individual freedom will replace coercion and tyranny, economic freedom - economic governance and stagnation, and lasting peace will be strengthened by joint respect for human rights.¹⁰

On January 16, 1990, the U.S. President asked the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, to present for the first time in public the military doctrine. Bush's presence in Vienna at the CSCE seminar on military doctrine was tangible evidence of the United States of America transatlantic commitment.¹¹ President Bush, along with the European Commission President Charles Hungary emphasised in a joint statement that the European Community and its member states also share the interests of the United States of America in developing transatlantic relations. They pointed to an important step taken towards a new structure for strengthening economic and political relations between the European Community and the United States of America.¹²

After events such as the crisis in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf and the suspension of military operations on this theatre by President Bush on February 28, 1991, ratification of the treaty on the reunification of Germany on March 4, 1991, by the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union and issuing a statement by the heads of diplomacy of NATO countries gathered on June 6-7, 1991 in Copenhagen on the partnership with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the United States of America was able to

implement its ideas in the realisation of their interests more effectively in the new Europe.

U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker, while in Berlin on June 18, 1991, emphasised that it was here that the USA and Europe began building a transatlantic community. He recalled his earlier speech in Berlin in December 1989 outlining common views on the architecture of New Europe and New Atlantis. He stated that the United States of America and the European Community have made significant progress in this regard. He also emphasised that the transatlantic community must enlarge to Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The goal of the U.S. was to build a whole and free Europe as well as a Euro-Atlantic community that stretches from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Baker recalled the words of President Bush, who spoke about new shared values of freedom, shared principles that constitute shared values. Secretary Baker also announced that the construction of a wider Euro-Atlantic community is beginning. However, there was a need to imagine each country's place in this new architecture. He also stated that such a structure requires setting a long-term NATO goal. The latter, however, required the establishment of cooperative security components for a whole and free Europe and a demonstration of how European integration is dealing with the new dangers of old hostility systems. Besides, Baker said that building a Euro-Atlantic community can only be successful if democratic principles are adopted. For this reason, the architects of united Europe adopted the principle of subsidiarity, something like - as Baker emphasised - of American federalism. He also strongly emphasised that the strengthening of the Euro-Atlantic community depends on cooperation in maintaining the pace of European integration and its institutional development. Besides, it is worth mentioning the USA - EC Declaration. It was the first

step on this path. Baker pointed out that NATO plays a complementary role in this respect. A strong defence alliance will allow maintaining a high level of military forces and will be the foundation of Europe's internal stability.¹³

The new situation in Europe has modified the role of the North Atlantic Alliance. However, the United States of America proclaiming the slogan of an undivided and free Europe also associated Central European countries with U.S. interests. The new ambitions of the European Community, the United States of America tried to use to create New Atlanticism, following its strategic interests, maintaining the 'global role' of its armed forces. There was still a prevailing conviction among European NATO members that the United States of America's military presence on the continent was needed for their individual and shared security. It was also aware that Americans could only maintain this presence within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation structure. It was stated very clearly by the U.S. ambassador to Germany, Vernon A. Walters: 'Congress will not accept the presence of American troops in Europe under patronage other than NATO'.¹⁴

During the collapse of the block system, the United States of America presented planned and deliberately connected concepts of New Europe and New Atlanticism, based on the North Atlantic Alliance, building the architecture of the new reality. This architecture subordinated the European Community and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to the interests of the United States of America. The U.S. felt vindicated with the successful results of utilising NATO to integrate Europe, while at the same time, they were able to strengthen their position in Europe. The year 1990 brought success to the United States of America, its political goals have been achieved and Europe becomes 'whole and free'. The U.S. policy goals have essentially

remained the same: expanding both NATO and the European Union. Moreover, a reasonable weights distribution and maintaining United States of America presence in Europe.¹⁵

2. Changes in Alliance

After the end of the Cold War, deep internal changes began in the North Atlantic Alliance.¹⁶ During the NATO summit in Washington, at the end of May 1989, the Alliance adopted President Bush's arms control initiative and announced a declaration of the Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament. It called for speeding up CFE negotiations, for major reductions in other types of conventional forces, and significant reductions in U.S. and Soviet military personnel stationed abroad. The talks ended with the signing of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) on November 19, 1990, which introduced the reduction of conventional armaments concerning the following five categories of conventional armed forces: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters. The treaty covered the land territories of the States Parties from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals.¹⁷

On July 31, 1991, a treaty was adopted in Moscow between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on strategic offensive weapons reduction (START I).¹⁸ In September 1991, NATO member states announced a reduction in the sphere of short- and medium-range nuclear forces, including nuclear artillery, ground-to-ground missiles, and ground-to-air missiles. On July 10, 1992, the final act of negotiations on the number of personnel of conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE 1A) was signed in Helsinki, which is - as stated in the CFE statement issued during the ministerial meeting

of the North Atlantic Council on December 8, 1998 - the cornerstone of security European.¹⁹ On January 3, 1993, the START II system was signed, which announced the abandonment of multi-head ballistic intercontinental missiles and envisaged a reduction of strategic nuclear charges by two-thirds.

Since the early 1990s, the changes in the Alliance's armed forces were characterized by its reduction in numbers, improving flexibility, mobility, and the creation of multinational units.²⁰ After the Cold War, the Alliance's armed forces were adapted to new conditions. NATO forces had to take to the new tasks of NATO. In such a situation, was presented the European Security and Defence Identity concept. It enabled keeping the most efficient and numerous European allies forces ready and integrating multinational forces within larger operational units under U.S. command as an indispensable element of the American concept of global leadership.

On July 5-6, 1990, in London, during the Alliance summit, the member states adopted the 'London Declaration on the transformation of the Alliance'. They declared in paragraph 3 that the EC's construction of a political union and European identity in the field of security will contribute to 'Atlantic solidarity, and to establishing a just and lasting peace order throughout Europe'.²¹ The European Security and Defence Identity has become an integral part of the adaptation program of NATO's political and military structures to the changing external environment. However, during the Rome NATO summit, in November 1991, the Alliance adopted a new Strategic Concept. The Member States pointed out that integrated and multinational European structures will develop the emerging European defence identity. It will also have an important role in increasing the ability of collective defence.²² Besides, a Declaration on Peace and Cooperation was adopted at the conclusion of the North

Atlantic Council meeting in Rome at the level of Heads of State and Government. It mentions that the formation of a European identity in the field of security and its defensive role finds expression in the further strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, which will strengthen the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance.²³

In October 1991, French and German representatives met in La Rochelle to discuss joint efforts to establish an autonomous Euro defence capability. The result was the establishment of the Eurocorps by both countries. According to the French concept, it was to be the nucleus of the future European army. The move of both states has given rise to clear U.S. opposition. Following the diplomatic interventions of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, an agreement was concluded in December 1992 with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. This agreement said that the Eurocorps would be put at the disposal of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and WEU, not only in the event of an alliance attacking one of the member states but also in the case of organising missions aimed at maintaining peace or protecting humanitarian aid. During the negotiations, France reported the principle of sovereignty of the countries forming the Eurocorps when deciding on operational command.

Member States of the Western European Union on December 10, 1991, in Maastricht, adopted the declaration 'The role of WEU and its relations with the EU and the Atlantic Alliance', stating that the European Security and Defence Identity will be formed in stages. Western European Union Members have also declared that over time WEU will become part of the European Union. In addition, as an ESDI goal, the Western European Union member states recognised the development of a common defence policy within the European

Union over time, which could lead to joint defence in due time in line with defence within the North Atlantic Alliance.²⁴

On February 7, 1992, in Maastricht, the EU adopted the Treaty on European Union. It contained Chapter V on Common Foreign and Security Policy. The treaty did not establish new institutional solutions creating an alternative to NATO. Nor did it establish a system of joint defence of Western European countries. The abovementioned Chapter V emphasised the strengthening of the EU and its Member States' security in all forms. The signatories acknowledged that the common foreign policy in the field of security covers all problems related to the security of the European Union, including the issue of the definition of a common defence policy, which may lead to joint defence in the future. In addition, EU countries have stated that the Western European Union is an integral component of the common security policy development. At the same time, the signatories confirmed that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation plays a key role in the security of Western Europe. Therefore, the defence policy of the European Union is to respect the obligations of some signatory states resulting from participation in the North Atlantic Treaty and is to be compatible with the common security and defence policy established under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.²⁵

Member States of the Western European Union on 19 June 1992 adopted the 'Petersberg Declaration', consisting of three parts. First, they announced strengthening the disarmament process and limiting arms, and the WEU's readiness to participate fully together with the European Union in building the European security architecture. The second was to strengthen the WEU's operational role, including humanitarian and evacuation missions, peace-keeping missions, and armed forces missions to resolve crises, including peace-restoring operations.

The third element was devoted to relations between the countries belonging to the Western European Union and other members of the European Union or European countries belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.²⁶

From the onset of the Clinton Administration in 1993, the primary goal was to strengthen American leadership. He sought to strengthen the idea of European Security and Defence Identity. While pointing out that the work on ESDI must be based on the concept of 'disjoint but not separate' European capabilities. Avoiding unnecessary duplication of defence structures will be the best way to maintain transatlantic ties.²⁷ On 10-11 January 1994, in Brussels, the North Atlantic Council accepted the Clinton administration of the European Security and Defence Identity vision. Thus, the idea of 'disjoint, but not separate' potentials was adopted, and thus the possibility of sharing the resources of the North Atlantic Alliance for the needs of European missions that go beyond collective defence. The potentials mentioned in the declaration are intelligence systems, long-range transport, early warning systems, communication elements, command, and operational supervision. It was also emphasised that the North Atlantic Alliance remains responsible for collective defence obligations under the Washington Treaty and the Modified Brussels Treaty.²⁸

The case of NATO commands

The adaptation process of the command structure, directly related to the new situation, was to make it:

- uniform, though multinational, capable of fulfilling all types of Alliance tasks, subordinated to the political leadership of the North Atlantic Council,
- more mobility,

- enabling the development of a European Security and Defence Identity within NATO,
- flexible, which will allow for greater participation in the Alliance's activities, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and will create conditions for rapid structural assimilation of new members,
- cost-effective and cost-effective, while considering political and military requirements.²⁹

Despite opposition from European allies, the United States of America in Berlin in June 1996 and Brussels in December of the same year managed to push through the concept of maintaining the NATO Allied Command Europe (ACE) and the NATO Allied Command in the Atlantic (ACLANT) and leaving both structures under U.S. command. In turn, the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) in its national function, as the commander of the United States of America forces in the Atlantic theatre of operations, remained the main supplier of units stationed in North America for other U.S. overseas commands. Also, for the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). It is the highest commander of the U.S. forces in the European theatre.

As part of the Allied Command Europe, three regional commands were created in place of - Northern Area Command with headquarters in Brunssum in the Netherlands, which took over the former Central Command; - Command of the Southern area, which retained its headquarters in Naples and controlled the area of Spain. The Northern Area Command was subject to two functional commands: Air Force with headquarters in Ramstein and Naval Forces in Northwood. As well as three combined sub-regional commands: Central with headquarters in Heidelberg, North-East in Karup, and North with headquarters in Stavanger. In turn, the South Area Command was subject to two functional

commands: air and naval forces with headquarters in Naples and four combined sub-regional commands - South-East with headquarters in Izmir, Central-North in Larissa, South in Verona, and South-West having headquarters in Madrid.³⁰ Before the start of the Madrid Summit on July 8, France strove to entrust the command of the southern theatre with headquarters in Naples to Europeans. However, the United States of America, which has a wider range of pressure on its European allies and the fleet stationed in this region, has not allowed such a solution.

NATO's Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)

The instability of the new international situation, with constantly emerging challenges and threats to national and international security, has triggered adaptation processes in most international structures. The political genesis of CJTF should be sought at the turn of the eighties and nineties, i.e., during the collapse of the block system. NATO's Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) became a modified concept of the American doctrine of the Joint Task Force (JTF). During the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation summit in Brussels on January 10, 1994, the heads of state and government of NATO participating in the summit adopted in the context of European Security and Defence Identity, the American concept of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) as part of President Clinton's idea of 'disjoint but not separate' resources of the Alliance. The CJTF concept was intended to prepare the Alliance for a new type of 'non-art V' operation and the participation of partner countries in operations of the North Atlantic Alliance beyond collective defence. In addition, it was to ensure the possibility of using NATO command structures for the needs of independent European operations.³¹ During the summit, NATO member states adopted the development - thanks to the WEU - of the European pillar of

the Alliance and declared in this context their readiness to make available common NATO resources for Western European Union operations undertaken by European allies. To this end, the Alliance has taken measures to develop the capabilities necessary for the European operations. While strengthening the defence capabilities of the entire Organisation. They were described as 'separable' but remained part of allied structures. The CJTF concept was intended to serve the American vision of maintaining European allies in NATO, an organisation managed by Washington. Due to differences within the Alliance regarding the view of the Combined Joint Task Force (especially through France), a dead period of two years occurred in the implementation of this concept. France wanted to use this concept as an instrument enabling Europeans to conduct their operations without the United States of America while using U.S. resources.

In March 1996, French Prime Minister Alain Juppé then proposed to create an army of 250-350 thousand soldiers by France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain, capable of conducting operations in the event of a crisis outside NATO. In Germany, because of Washington's persuasion, this idea was not enthusiastic.³² During a session in June 1996, NATO adopted the Berlin Declaration in line with the American vision,³³ confirming that ESDI is one of the essential elements of the internal adaptation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. At the same time, the necessary decisions were made to enable its implementation. The Council decided on the CJTF, highlighting their convergence with the European Security and Defence Identity objectives as a concept enabling the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operations under the political control and strategic direction of WEU. In addition, according to the American vision, Alliance forces were to be

transferred to the Western European Union only after the North Atlantic Council (NAC) decision and, importantly. While the Council controlled the use of these forces. In addition, the North Atlantic Council reserved the detailed conditions for the NATO forces' use and the oversight of missions carried out by the Western European Union.³⁴

The North Atlantic Council at the level of defence ministers, on December 17, 1998, announced the *Final Communiqué*. In the document, the Council stated that it had adopted a report on the progress made in recent months on the internal adaptation of the Alliance. It pointed out in particular: the new NATO command structure, the concept of NATO's Combined Joint Task Force, and the European Security and Defence Identity. The main objectives of the abovementioned adaptation were to increase the military effectiveness of the Alliance in the full spectrum of its mission, to preserve transatlantic unions, and to develop ESDI under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Alliance countries strongly emphasised that NATO would remain the basic forum for inter-allied consultations and a place to agree on their policies affecting the security and defence obligations of allies under the Washington Treaty.³⁵

The North Atlantic Council adopted a detailed plan developed by NATO military authorities regarding the implementation of the new command structure, which was to enable the preparation, support, conduct, and command of WEU-led operations. In the case of the Combined Joint Task Force, they were found to be a fundamental element of the Alliance's internal adaptation. It was also emphasised that the adaptation provides the military flexibility necessary to cope with a wide range of anti-crisis operations. The possibility of using CJTF for the operations of the Western European Union, using NATO resources and capabilities, was an important ESDI development

tool within the Alliance. NATO's Combined Joint Task Force were also to facilitate the non-Alliance countries' involvement in operations led by the North Atlantic Alliance. It was found that the second phase of implementation of the CJTF concept is currently being implemented, considering the conclusions of two earlier attempts to implement NATO's Combined Joint Task Force. The result was an in-depth assessment of the Alliance's ability to deploy CJTF land and sea command on a smaller and larger scale. The outcome of this work carried out until March 1999, constituted the basis for the transition to the third and final phase of the allied concept of NATO's Combined Joint Task Force appliance. To enable the implementation of the decisions on military operations, Member States were to form appropriate forces, including staff, that could participate in crisis management operations. However, without unnecessary duplication of existing capabilities. These forces were to be characterized by availability for actions in various places (deployability); sustainability; ability to interact with other forces (interoperability); flexibility (flexibility) and mobility (mobility). In specific cases, the WEU was to decide whether to use NATO infrastructure and resources in its operations. In the first case, this was to be carried out considering the decisions of the North Atlantic Council adopted in Berlin in 1996³⁶ as well as in Washington, in 1999. In addition, heads of state and government of the North Atlantic Alliance member states participating in the summit held on July 8-9, 1997, in Madrid, talking about ESDI, confirmed that the Western European Union was an essential element of this identity.³⁷ Due to discrepancies regarding the CJTF, mainly due to the overwhelming advantage of the United States of America in the Alliance, the concept of the Combined Joint Task Force remained only at the stage of reflection and discussion.

Impact of European Union initiatives on the internal transformation of the NATO

Member States of the European Union on October 2, 1997, adopted the new treaty on the European Union, which brought changes in the functioning of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. During the summit, EU countries recognised CFSP as the European Union domain and not, as before, the Union and the Member States. The principle of constructive abstention was introduced, which enabled the European Union to act without the participation of the Member States not opposed to the action, but not interested in participating in it (at most 1/3 of the weighted votes). Also formed was the post of High Representative for the CFSP, whom it began to hold as Secretary-General of the European Council. In addition, Member States set up Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit to monitor and analyse the situation, formulate assessments, and 'European positions' on specific international issues.

The issues of joint European defence took a special place during the summit. A heated discussion was conducted on the future cooperation of the European Union with the WEU. France proposed the merger of the Western European Union with the EU. However, due to the objections of the United Kingdom, Ireland, Sweden, and Finland the idea was not accepted. On the other hand, a compromise was adopted stating that WEU could be included in the European Union if the European Council so decides. By extending Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty (Article 17 of the Amsterdam Treaty), Member States have stated that the Western European Union provides the European Union with access to operational funds, primarily in the context of the Petersberg missions. Therefore, it was assumed that if the WEU is used by the European Union for Petersberg missions, all EU

Member States (including WEU observers) should be able to participate fully in the decision-making process (Article 17, paragraph 3). Further, the European Council was obliged to adopt, in consultation with the Western European Union, appropriate regulations that would allow observer countries to participate in each operation to actively participate in the decision-making process and planning activities in WEU. For the first time, the Treaty included cooperation in the field of armaments. Art. 17 par. 1 states that building a common security policy will be supported by appropriate (by the will of EU members) cooperation in this area.³⁸

In October 1998, during an informal meeting of heads of state and government of the European Union countries, in Pörschach, Austria, British Prime Minister Tony Blair proposed fresh thinking of European security issues. He pointed the need to consider such options, such as strengthening the European Security and Defence Identity in NATO, eliminating WEU, creating the fourth pillar of the European Union, or finally establishing a European Defence Council.³⁹ It was an intriguing proposition presented by the United Kingdom. Then, the Minister of Defence of UK George Robertson a few days later, on November 4, 1998, during a meeting of defence ministers of the European Union in Vienna, however, he distanced himself from the proposal of Prime Minister Blair regarding the creation of the fourth pillar of the European Union. Instead, he spoke in favour of joining the Western European Union and the European Union, while at the same time absorbing certain WEU elements by NATO. He also stated that the North Atlantic Alliance must play a major role in European security matters.

In December 1998, the European Council asked the German Presidency to continue the discussion on strengthening the Common Foreign and Security Policy and to consider the issue

again at the European Union Summit in Cologne on 3-4 June 1999. In December 1998, the French and German representatives convened again, this time in Potsdam. Summit participants expressed their will to join the WEU to the European Union. France and Germany have indicated that to be able to implement the findings of the declaration, the European Union should have the appropriate means of analysing the situation, intelligence structures, and strategic planning capacity.⁴⁰ Two days later, on December 4, 1998, in the French town of Saint-Malo, France, and the United Kingdom adopted a joint British-French declaration on European defence. This document laid the foundation for further developing the process of European cooperation in the field of defence. Both states stated in the declaration that the North Atlantic Alliance will remain the foundation of the joint defence of European countries while maintaining art. V of the Modified Brussels Treaty, stated that the European Union should independently decide to act in crises and have the appropriate capacity for effective operation using military forces. Besides, they indicated that Europeans should act as part of the EU institutions: the European Council, the General Affairs Council, and possibly as part of meetings of defence ministers.⁴¹

When discussing the Saint-Malo declaration, it is also worth mentioning the Report of the EU Presidency. It outlines the strengthening of the Common European Security and Defence Policy and mentions the political and decision-making aspects of CFSP development within the European Union, and institutional transformations. It emphasises, above all, while maintaining the Brussels Treaty, the takeover by the European Union of those WEU cells that were necessary for the effective conduct of Petersberg operations. The report instructed the General Affairs Council (GAC) to develop the principles. Also announced was

the establishment of new bodies such as the Political and Security Committee (PSC) as an advisory body and the Military Committee (EUMC) as well as holding regular (or ad hoc) General Affairs Council meetings with defence ministers. It also provides for the development of European forces, with attention to intelligence, strategic transport, and command and control. Additionally, the Report called for the restructuring and cooperation of defence industries through, inter alia, coordination of needs, planning, and supply. The document also stated that the development of operational capabilities was to concern only possible operations beyond art. 5 of the Washington Treaty and art. V of the Modified Brussels Treaty. The issue of common defence remained the responsibility of the North Atlantic Alliance. The report also announced that EU member states would always make decisions on the use of the Alliance's capabilities and resources before starting an operation.⁴²

In December 1998, in response to the initiatives of the European Union, French diplomacy, regarding the North Atlantic Alliance, a few days after the announcement of the Saint-Malo Declaration, during the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the final announcement was adopted. The document pointed to the strengthening of transatlantic unions and the development of European Security and Defence Identity within NATO, profound progress in implementing the concept of the Combined Joint Task Force, and preparation for the implementation of a new command structure. In response to the European Union's proposals for the gradual incorporation of WEU into the European Union, the North Atlantic Council noted the close cooperation with the Western European Union, which was confirmed during the WEU Ministerial Council meeting on February 16-17, 1998, in Rome. The communication also emphasised the need for regular meetings of the Western

European Union's subordinate structures, consultation on planning and conducting operations, and WEU-led exercises on the use of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation resources and capabilities.⁴³ These elements, following the communication, were important for the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance. The communiqué also commissioned the Permanent Council that, by the time of the Washington Summit, the Council should start implementing the key tasks contained in the Brussels and Berlin decisions on ESDI. At the same time, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright announced '3D' (non-decoupling, non-discrimination, non-duplication). Thus, even in the case of a European operation, the prerequisite for action should be prior discussion and full agreement between the United States of America and European allies as to the purpose of the intervention.⁴⁴ It was also necessary to consider the various relations of individual states from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Union (this involved European non-EU NATO members and non-NATO EU members). Besides, duplication of existing resources and structures had to be avoided.

On December 17, 1998, the North Atlantic Council stated that much had already been achieved in the field of ESDI development within North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, as defined by ministers in their Berlin and Brussels decisions of June 1996. Ministers announced that preparations for WEU-led operations using the resources and capabilities of the Alliance are currently very advanced. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation cooperated closely with the Western European Union in this matter, firmly following the principle of separable but not separate capabilities. It was stated that the Alliance was working primarily on the development of clear and fully compatible joint solutions in the field of NATO and WEU consultations in the

conditions of a crisis that could lead to the launch of Western European Union operations using the Alliance's resources and capabilities. Also, it was to work on transferring, monitoring, and returning NATO resources and capabilities made available for WEU-led operations and on including the Western European Union in the allied defence planning process. Besides, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was working on integrating the needs of WEU-led operations into defence planning and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation exercise program. The communication highlighted the role of training and exercises to streamline and test various solutions in supporting the North Atlantic Alliance for operations led by the Western European Union. The document also mentioned the planning of joint NATO and Western European Union workshops devoted to crisis management. Such activities took place in September 1998 to improve mutual consultative mechanisms in the event of an operation led by the Western European Union that uses the resources and capabilities of the Alliance. In the perspective of the Washington Summit, the ministers attending the meeting instructed the Permanent Council to intensify work on the remaining issues. It was related to the internal adaptation of the Alliance on key aspects of the European Security and Defence Identity. Also, it was stated that they expected the Council to issue appropriate recommendations aimed at improving the effectiveness of ESDI within the Alliance, considering the contribution of European allies, over a time horizon beyond the Washington meeting.⁴⁵

On March 23-25, 1999, the expected NATO summit was held in Washington. In addition to the new North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Strategic Concept, member states have adopted two documents regarding the European Security and Defence Identity development within the Alliance. The first is the 'Report on the

implementation of ESDI within NATO' and the second is the 'Final Summit Communication', which contains more detailed proposals. This announcement disclosed the completion of work on the essential elements of ESDI development identified in 1996 in Berlin. Article 9 of the document stated that the Alliance noted a growing desire among members of the European Union to have the ability to undertake autonomous military operations in crisis when NATO will not be involved in them. The communication further defines the basic conditions for the further development of the European Security and Defence Identity. Alliance members declared it was necessary to maintain full agreement and transparency between the two organisations while relying on the use of mechanisms already developed between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the WEU. The principle of avoiding duplication of efforts to strengthen the practical defence capabilities of all member states of both the European Union and NATO was also very strongly emphasised. In addition, it was stated that it was necessary to guarantee allies not belonging to the EU to participate as fully as possible in operations under the aegis of the European Union based on consultation mechanisms developed in the Western European Union.

The Communiqué in art. 10 stressed that the Alliance was prepared to develop solutions that would enable the European Union to access common NATO resources. Alliance members have pre-determined the main capabilities that should be achieved. The EU's access to the Alliance's planning capabilities that could support the military planning of European Union operations was exchanged. In addition, identification of European command options for EU operations and refining the rules of NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (D-SACEUR) functioning were indicated. Moreover, the allied

states announced a further improvement of the NATO defence planning system to consider the principle of the availability of Alliance forces more explicitly for the needs of European operations.⁴⁶

Shortly after the NATO summit in Washington, on May 29, 1999, French diplomacy at the summit of the Franco-German Defence and Security Council led to the signing of the Franco-German declaration in Toulouse. In the document, France and Germany expressed their determination to endow the European Union with autonomous measures that enable it to make decisions and act in the event of crises. In addition, in agreement with Belgium, Spain, and Luxembourg, they declared their willingness to adapt the European corps, and above all its general staff, to the needs of acting as a European rapid reaction force. The document stresses that European security and defence requires a 'strong, dynamic and guaranteeing good results' industrial and technological base.⁴⁷

As stated by Frank Boland, head of the Force Planning Section of NATO's Defence Planning and Operations Division, the North Atlantic Alliance must be prepared to conduct operations outside or on the edge of the Alliance's territory.⁴⁸ Therefore, heads of state and government of NATO countries at the Washington Summit, under the American vision of the Alliance, decided on the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI). Its task was to increase defence capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations in the full spectrum of Alliance missions. It was primarily about improving the ability to quickly move significant armed forces outside their territory and conduct operations over an extended time horizon. Therefore, it was stated that Communication, Command, Control, and Information (C3I) systems need to be better adapted to future military operations.⁴⁹ As part of the Defence

Capabilities Initiative, a High-Level Steering Group (HLSG) was established to oversee the implementation of DCI and meet the requirements of coordination and harmonization of various planning categories, including for allies involved in force planning and concerning standardisation within NATO. As the American administration has repeatedly emphasised, the European Security and Defence Identity had to be compatible with the Defence Capabilities Initiative.⁵⁰

Shortly after the NATO summit, the European Council meeting in Cologne on June 3-4, 1999, adopted a declaration presenting the position of EU Member States on strengthening the common European security and defence policy. The Council defined this policy as primarily conflict prevention and crisis resolution using Petersberg missions, without prejudice to NATO operations and under the principles of the UN Charter. It has become necessary: developing the EU capabilities and instruments, close cooperation between the Union and NATO, the creation of an industrial and technological base for joint defence, as well as the inclusion of WEU in the necessary scope by the end of 2000. In this case, states underlined in a declaration that the Western European Union as an organisation would have completed its mission. Besides, it was stated that Member States' diverse situations in terms of guaranteeing collective defence would not suffer because the North Atlantic Alliance remains the basis for the collective defence of its members.⁵¹

During the European Union Summit in Helsinki on December 10-11, 1999, the European Council adopted two reports of the Finnish Presidency attached to the conclusions. The documents concerned the strengthening of the Common European Security and Defence Policy and non-military crisis management. During the summit, the European Union countries developed an idea that was defined in Cologne regarding the

possibility of the European Union using NATO forces. They also decided to establish new political and military structures. The Political and Security Committee, composed of representatives of states at the level of ambassadors, was to exercise political control and strategic direction of anti-crisis operations under the supervision of the Council. The Military Committee, consisting of the member states heads of the armed forces with the strategic management and political supervision of military crisis operations, conducted by the European Union. The Military Staff was to supervise operations using the armed forces, analyse the situation, and strategic planning for Petersberg missions. It was decided that until the establishment of the final structures of the Common European Security and Defence Policy, from the beginning of March 2000, temporary structures such as the Interim Political and Security Committee and the Interim Military Body would operate. From a practical standpoint, the possibilities of conducting operations independently by the European Union, the 'Headline Goal' program was key. It envisaged the creation of European rapid reaction forces (between 50,000 and 60,000) by the Member States by 2003 capable of fully implementing Petersberg tasks. These forces were to be able to deploy within 60 days and maintain for at least a year. Also, the European Union has set itself the goal of developing opportunities for collective action, including achieving EU self-sufficiency in command and control, intelligence and logistics, and material supply. In this regard, it was crucial to implement actions coordinating the monitoring and early warning measures. It enabled officers of other Member States to participate in existing joint national commands, increase the number of forces capable of immediate deployment, and expand the rapid response capabilities of already existing

European multinational forces, creating the basis for the development of air and sea transport.⁵²

At the beginning of February 2000, two documents were presented that concerned the European Union's relations with NATO and with third countries. At the time, it was proposed the creation of separate structures within the so-called European Security and Defence Framework (ESDF), parallel to the Political and Security Committee and the EU Military Committee. It would meet regularly in an expanded form: 15 EU countries + 6 non-EU NATO members. The Portuguese document also provided for the creation of posts in the EU Military Staff for liaison officers from non-European Union countries reporting readiness to participate in EU crisis operations.⁵³ Portuguese proposals were immediately criticized by France in the Political Committee and General Affairs Council on February 14-15, 2000. During the European Council Summit in Santa Maria de Feira in June 2000, the heads of state and government and European Union member states confirmed their commitment to building CESDP, capable of strengthening external action. Improving European capabilities is essential to the credibility and effectiveness of the Common European Security and Defence Policy. The European Council stated that it is committed to meeting the Headline Goal goals by 2003. Importantly, the European Council announced regular meetings on CESDP with European non-European Union NATO members in the EU + 6 formula.⁵⁴

On November 13, 2000, the WEU Council of Ministers adopted the 'Marseille Declaration' in which it was pleased to note an agreement with the European Union regarding activities within this organisation of the WEU Satellite Centre and the Institute for Security Studies.⁵⁵ Before the start of the European Union Summit in Nice, U.S. Secretary of Defence William

Cohen strongly communicated to his European allies that the concept of CESDP must be shaped in such a way as to strengthen and not weaken NATO.⁵⁶ During the European Union Summit in Nice in December 2000, French President Jacques Chirac stated that the European Union should be capable of military operations coordinated with NATO, but independent.⁵⁷ The final draft from the summit announced on two sides the autonomous capacity of the Union to make decisions, and in cases where the North Atlantic Alliance as a whole would not be involved, to launch and conduct anti-crisis operations. The President of France's statement met with a sharp response from U.S. Secretary of Defence William Cohen. The secretary announced that France's fuelling the Union's military ambitions, and the pursuit of NATO-independent planning capabilities, would weaken the defence ties between North America and Western Europe. This reaction was caused by the U.S. concern regarding the extent of their control over NATO's forces and tools. Therefore, at the request of British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the draft final document from the summit was drastically cut. The summit's final document contained only a small mention of the emerging European security and defence policy, which for now boils down to the creation of political-military structures and rapid reaction forces.

U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright after the end of the European Union summit welcomed the fact that the EU leaders in Nice expressed strong support for close and regular consultations with NATO. Albright expressed ESDI's success would benefit Europe, the United States of America, and transatlantic relations in full. The Secretary strongly emphasised that American involvement in Europe must be stable and secure, based on clear and mutual understanding, and that American and European fundamental security interests are indivisible.⁵⁸ The

process of internal transformation that took place in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in the new international situation was intended to maintain American influence in NATO and, in perspective, to promote the global interests of the United States of America.⁵⁹

3. New challenges

Despite changes in the international environment and adaptation processes within NATO, the collective defence would undoubtedly remain a vital function of the 21st century Alliance. The vital security interests of the Alliance and the perception of these interests by the U.S. were to affect operations carried out outside the territory of the Member States.⁶⁰ It is a vision of the Alliance that did not focus solely on Europe as such and did not limit its interests and activities to its area. In their new role, the United States of America and the EU joined in the mission to spread European Union values to guard their interests on a global scale. The philosophy behind this system is very simple: if you can't do the job yourself, you'll be more effective in your team. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation development began not to be subject to geographical restrictions but required the United States of America and Europe to define the concept of their vital interests and common interests, and it would decide about the scope of activity of the new NATO willing to take on much broader tasks on a global scale.⁶¹

European strategic autonomy and the American concept of the European Security and Defence Identity are crucial to the United States of America's global strategy. ESDI, implemented under the spirit of the U.S. was to allow Americans to maintain a dominant position on the European continent. The U.S. global primacy largely depended on it. The European Security and

Defence Identity has become an important element of the game for global hegemony. The United States of America could have a powerful influence on countries outside this continent. The U.S. needed European allies. They certainly still need Europe to carry out the Alliance's global mission, in many cases on the terms set out by Washington.

Europe has remained an important element of the global economy and politics. If the United States of America intends to preserve its global hegemony, the question of how the U.S. deal with the increasingly complex political relations in Europe is becoming crucial. Actions aimed at developing a definition of the Alliance's global mission have been undertaken since the collapse of the block system. It can be pointed out in the American concepts of New Europe and New Atlantis presented at the beginning of this chapter. These ideas emerged during the crisis in the Persian (Arab) Gulf. Allied naval forces were sent in 1987 and 1990. The Iraqi aggression on Kuwait in August 1990 undoubtedly contributed to the definition of out-of-area alliance operations, i.e., the Alliance's exit from its treaty area.

An element aiming at the global vision of the Alliance was undoubtedly the meeting of defence ministers of NATO countries with defence ministers of partner countries in Brussels on April 1, 1992, in the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). During this meeting, the ministers foresaw future joint rescue operations and peacekeeping missions.⁶² In June 1992, a few weeks before the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), at the Helsinki II summit in Oslo, a meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) was held. The Council underlined its readiness to support peacekeeping missions conducted by the CSCE, and the willingness to make available resources of the North Atlantic Alliance.⁶³ In turn, on December 17, 1992, the North Atlantic

Council in Brussels declared the readiness of the North Atlantic Alliance to support peace operations under the aegis of the UN Security Council.⁶⁴

As these events took place, a civil war was brewing in Yugoslavia. In July 1992, the North Atlantic Alliance and the WEU began the operation of the naval forces in the Adriatic. Initially to monitor and support the arms embargo, and then also to stop and inspect ships. On April 12, 1993, with the fighters and reconnaissance aircraft use, the Alliance's air forces began Operation Deny Flight. The first-ever clash of NATO forces with the enemy occurred on February 28, 1994. Four Bosnian Serbian military planes were shot down at the time. On 5 August 1994, in Bosnia, the first air attack of NATO forces on a ground target occurred. This situation has accelerated a deeper discussion about the Alliance's responsibility outside the treaty area. On March 28, 1998, in an interview with *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, the then German Defence Minister Volker Ruehe said that the existing one-dimensional definition of the threat pattern is being replaced by multi-level risk and challenges that relate to crises and conflicts in the strategic triangle: the Balkans, Caucasus, and the Middle East, North Africa. In such a situation, a defence organisation [NATO] is obliged to go beyond defending only the territory of the organisation members, in the name of the common interest in preserving and defending peace, stability in Europe and for Europe.⁶⁵

The military intervention of the North Atlantic Alliance in Kosovo started on March 24, 1999, clearly showed that the fight for the Balkans was underway, which is one of the potential geopolitical trophies in the competition for supremacy in Europe.⁶⁶ This NATO operation - a collective defence organisation as a collective security institution (UN) - has brought a shift away from the U.S. 'New York system' of

international relations to the U.S. 'Washington-Brussels system'. The crisis in Kosovo and the intervention of the North Atlantic Alliance indicated the events that would transpire in the years to come: - the United States of America' pursuit of independent leadership in a unipolar security structure; - weakening, through institutional changes in international policy of the United Nations, in which Russia was of great importance; - NATO's pursuit of expanding the bloc's responsibility zone, which resulted in the displacement of Russia from regions in which it traditionally played an important role. In the entire area of interest of the North Atlantic Alliance, the southern strategic flank of the Alliance and the Transcaucasia was the main strategic direction, i.e., as pointed out by Volker Ruehe, already cited, the strategic triangle: Balkans, Caucasus, and the Middle East, North Africa.⁶⁷ In this area, one can see how the concept of a global Alliance was being implemented, changing into a global gendarme, pursuing primarily 'American interests.

Alliance's southern flank

To the Americans, the Alliance's southern flank, i.e., the land south of Gibraltar to Iran – namely the Middle East and the Gulf, was an area they would soon be of strategic interest to the U.S.⁶⁸ For the United States of America, the Persian (Arabian) Gulf was a key theatre in this area. First, it was about oil. As a result of such actions, Iraq was excluded from the international oil market for a long time. Secondly, after the USSR collapsed, the United States of America sought to confirm its role as the only superpower. The intervention in Iraq was a convenient opportunity to strengthen this role and confirm U.S. hegemony. Third, the United States of America sought to eliminate Russian and Chinese influence in the Middle East region. Fourth, Washington wanted to end the instability in the Middle East

region. Iraq's territorial disintegration and the new political division of borders in Mesopotamia would be an introduction to this goal, including the exclusion of Saddam Hussein from the game. In turn, the inclusion of the North Atlantic Alliance in this game was to be a convenient tool for pursuing U.S. interests.

In 1999, just after the Washington Summit and the development of a new Strategic Concept, the concept of the European southern periphery appeared as NATO's 'near abroad'. The political and economic changes that took place on the global political scene after the collapse of the block system have made NATO 'southern region' key actors for the United States of America in the context of securing their interests on the Alliance's southern flank. The southern NATO region traditionally includes Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey. The Hungarian joining the Alliance formally added it's as the sixth member of the southern region to the Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH). Focusing on NATO's southern flank was a step towards a more global Alliance. It emphasised the interests of joint defence without relying on geographical borders. It could have been a substantial force in both political and operational terms.

Considering the changes in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the United States of America strategy, the Mediterranean region played a key role in exposing allied forces in the Middle East, the periphery of Europe (e.g., the Balkans), as well as in the Maghreb countries and Africa south of the Sahara. This huge area also offered many opportunities for foreign and security policy in terms of solving the Cyprus problem.⁶⁹ Moreover, effective influence on the Middle East process, or support for relations with Iran in matters concerning the development and transport of Caspian energy resources. All had an impact on European security and the role of the U.S. as a

global power. The Mediterranean region is a natural 'hallway' for exposing forces to the Persian (Arabian) and Caspian Gulf regions. During the Desert Shield and Desert Storm operations, approximately 90% of the forces and materials necessary to conduct the operation were transported through this region. For this reason, in Athens in June 1993, during a meeting of NATO foreign ministers, it was emphasised that European security was closely related to Mediterranean countries.⁷⁰ In December 1994, in Brussels, NATO foreign ministers announced the establishment of contacts between the Alliance and individual Mediterranean countries not belonging to the North Atlantic Alliance, indicating that this could contribute to strengthening the balance in the region.⁷¹ Energy security is an extremely important problem in the region from Gibraltar to the Persian (Arabian) Gulf and the Caspian region. Protecting access to the Persian (Arab) Gulf's energy resources imposes on the United States of America and at least some of NATO's allies the obligation to issue forces to shape secure relations in the Mediterranean region.

The new Strategic Concept provided the restructuring of NATO forces to strengthen the Alliance's ability to deploy outside. In this context, the United States of America developed the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) adopted in 1999 at the Washington Summit. This initiative was intended to help increase interoperability and strengthen the Alliance's ability to expose forces. During this reorientation, NATO had to be allowed to deal with threats that it could face in the future. This alignment of the Alliance created the impression in some Middle East and North African countries that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is trying to become a global policeman. Very often, these states emphasised that the United States of America perceives the Middle East as a region of their exclusive influence

(‘own garden’), in which, depending on the needs, they can use various types of activities to strengthen their influence.

Transcaucasia

The strategic region of the southern Caucasus includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, extending east of the Black Sea and west of the Caspian Sea. It borders Russia, Turkey, and Iran. During the Cold War, the North Atlantic Alliance focused almost exclusively on the European front. Central Asia at that time was under Soviet influence. The South-Caucasian region was a backwater of the Soviet Union. The U.S. became interested in exploiting the wealth of the region and did not want Russia to gain exclusive geopolitical dominance in the region again.⁷²

The natural resources in this region are mainly oil, natural gas, and gold. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, oil demand was then estimated at around 72 million barrels a day.⁷³ The vast and probably largely undiscovered energy resources of the Caspian region created enormous opportunities for the global fuel market development. The new energy supplies were to diversify the global fuel resources and help control price increases during the expected rapid increase in global fuel demand. According to the United States of America government at the time, the region had oil resources comparable to those in the North Sea and larger than those found in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf and the Gulf of Mexico.

Lucrative commercial opportunities for American and Western fuel corporations appeared in the Caspian Sea basin. Real prospects for exploiting Caspian oil and natural gas resources have encouraged Western oil companies to significantly expand their presence and financial participation in the Caspian Basin. In the 1990s, companies, mainly western ones, invested over \$ 40 billion in this region.⁷⁴ The geopolitical

South Caucasus and Central Asia significance for the West and NATO was to increase. Due to the energy potential and since conflicts and instability in this region may entail Russia's military intervention and contribute to the revival of Russian imperialism. Besides, access to energy resources was to be beneficial for Western energy security. The competition for control over these resources was to have a significant impact on the geopolitical landscape of Eurasia and the evolution of internal and foreign policy of countries such as Russia, China, Turkey, and Iran. Accordingly, U.S. policy was aimed at:

- strengthening the independence and development of new countries in the Caspian region,
- strengthening USA energy security through new sources of oil and natural gas,
- establishing economic links between the new countries of the Caspian region to mitigate regional conflicts,
- strengthening business prospects for U.S. companies.⁷⁵

The control of the United States of America over oil resources would mean the possibility of influencing the economies of Western European countries (their economies are based in 70% on oil imports) and Japan (90%). In turn, the capture of Caspian deposits by countries other than the United States of America would mean reducing the strategic importance of the Middle and the Middle East. For this reason, the United States of America would involve itself in Caspian projects. In the middle of both regions, where the U.S. wants to rule, remains Iran, which has rich energy sources. This meant that the United States of America wanted in its long-term policy to resolve the Iranian issue.

Several countries in the region were the U.S.'s major trading partners. Moreover, the United States of America played an active role in attempting to mediate ethnic conflicts there, also

using its tool - the North Atlantic Alliance. In addition, NATO expanded military contacts with several Caspian countries through the Partnership for Peace program and assisted those countries in reforming their armed forces. NATO, providing military, political, and economic assistance, was primarily concerned with strategic interests in stabilising the security of Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. The second group of countries includes Georgia and Turkmenistan, even though Georgia would deserve more attention because of the progress in democratic reforms.⁷⁶

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, seeking to expand the bloc's zone of responsibility, tried to push Russia away from the transit of energy carriers in the Caspian-North-Caucasian region and weaken its political influence there. It was implemented, among others, through the union of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (GUAM) associated with the United States of America.⁷⁷ On November 8, 2000, in Tbilisi, during an international conference on planning multinational peace manoeuvres for communications forces 'Combined Endeavor – 2000' as part of 'Partnership for Peace', the chief of the general staff of the Georgian Armed Forces, General Džoni Pirchałaiszwili said that Georgia 'taken a strategic course' on integration with NATO and the European Union. 250 military personnel from 35 countries participated in the conference. General Pirchałaiszwili emphasised that the Georgian army is currently being created by international standards, with the active assistance of the North Atlantic Alliance countries. He also noted that the organisation of the NATO conference in Tbilisi is Georgia's next step towards its rapprochement with the Atlantic. In an interview with London's *The Financial Times*, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze said that his country intends to apply to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation at the latest in

2005. Military exercises under the patronage of 'Partnership for Peace' and close military contacts between NATO and Caspian countries confirmed Western interests in the region.

The United States Air Force (USAF) was increasingly present in Azerbaijan and Georgia. Americans and Georgians worked together on a Georgian airspace traffic control program. Exercises, officer training, and technical training programs for military specialists were conducted. Besides, the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) conducted military assistance programs for Azerbaijan, Georgia, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Thanks to this, the U.S. had the possibility of military pressure on matters related to the oil flow. To legitimize its actions, the Americans had to cooperate with Turkey. Because of its proximity to the Caucasus region and difficulties in maintaining adequate conventional forces in this region without access to Turkish bases. Turkey is NATO's southern anchor. Its task is to stabilise the Black Sea region, control the straits connecting this region with the Mediterranean Sea, and balance Russia's influence in the Caucasus.

Notes

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Chapter 3

THE EUROPEAN STRATEGIC AUTONOMY IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA STRATEGY

Attempts to build European strategic autonomy have been inscribed by the United States of America's vision of the European Security and Defence Identity, i.e., a concept that allows in the post-Cold War reality to maintain the dominant role of the U.S. in Europe and beyond. While its implementation varied, a reoccurring aspect included American military forces stationed primarily in Europe. There is also the North Atlantic Alliance foundation, as well as U.S. intelligence and counterintelligence. Applying this concept without intelligence and counterintelligence services would certainly not be effective.

Another instrument to implement the American vision of ESDI was to promote the construction together with the Atlantic Community Europe, in which Americans want to share responsibility and profits. However, the idea was that the United States of America could continue to play the role of the world leader, which would not have been possible in the long run without Europe. Another mechanism conducive to the American concept implementation of the European Security and Defence Identity was the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance, which brought the United States of America new allies.

1. The Role of military forces

United States of America's military forces continue to play a crucial role in Europe. It is one of the key instruments of U.S. involvement on the 'Old Continent'. It ensures the implementation of the American national strategy, beneficial

relationships with European countries, and protect the vital interests of the United States of America in Europe and beyond. The U.S. Armed Forces, as stated in the national security strategy submitted to Congress by President Bill Clinton, was a key factor for U.S. success. The will and ability to play a leadership role guarantee that the United States of America will remain an influential actor in international relations - political, military, and economic - affecting national prosperity. As stressed in the strategy, it will continue if the U.S. consistently provides the military resources necessary to authenticate its commitments.

In the face of various threats, the United States of America must have a strong and flexible military force to protect its interests, which will be able to provide them with a credible presence abroad. Adequate U.S. forces and resources must be deployed in key regions of the world so that they can deter the aggressor in peacetime and support USA strategic interests.¹ Despite a significant forces' reduction in the 1990s, the Americans deployed approximately one hundred thousand military personnel on the 'Old Continent' to preserve American influence and leadership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, maintain vital transatlantic ties and ensure tangible deterrents.²

The United States of America's military presence in Europe has been subordinated to the unified strategic command - United States European Command (U.S. European Command - USEUCOM), responsible for planning and conducting all military operations within the Area of Responsibility (AOR).³ The United States European Command is one of the strategic areas commands that provide U.S. troops with a command structure adequate to their size and global reach for their tasks. USEUCOM's 'area of responsibility' extends from the northern cape of Norway to the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa. It is

an extensive area, covering almost 14 million square miles, 91 countries, and territories, inhabited by over a billion people. It is worth mentioning that three Middle East countries - Israel, Lebanon, and Syria were in the 'area of responsibility' of the European Command of the United States. In addition, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Western Sahara are also with the Area of Interest USEUCOM⁴. Over 100,000 American soldiers permanently stationed in Europe, Africa, and Asia have been assigned to the United States European Command as part of the United States European Command, namely:

- 65,000 American Army personnel for Europe (USAREUR) with headquarters in Heidelberg, Germany;
- 34,000 American Air Force Europe personnel (USAFE) with headquarters in Ramstein, Germany;
- 22,000 US Naval for Europe personnel (NAVEUR) with headquarters in London, UK;
- 3,900 personnel of the US Marine Corps for Europe (MARFOREUR) with headquarters in Boeblingen, Germany;
- 14,000 American Operational Special Forces (SOCEUR) personnel with headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany.

The United States European Command commanded a rapid response force, consisting of a light infantry battalion and aviation resources, as part of the Southern European Task Force (SETAF) with headquarters in Vicenza, Italy.⁵ The head of the five components of the armed forces assigned to USEUCOM was headed by the Head of the European Command of the United States (USCINEUR). The head of the European Union Command of the United States, which is important because of American leadership and the implementation of the American concept of ESDI, was also the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). United States European Command was also

involved in efforts to comply with the ban on flying over northern Iraq, a UN sanction.⁶

The activity of USEUCOM is crucial when it comes to military contacts, exercises, pieces of training that shape the international environment following the American concept. An important centre overseen by European Command to promote American ideas was the George C. Marshall Centre for Strategic Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen in Germany. Besides, several significant programs are worth mentioning in the field of military cooperation. One of them, whose administrator was United States European Command, was certainly the Joint Contact Team Program (Mil-to-Mil), offered by the United States to the Central and Eastern Europe countries. The purpose of the program according to American assumptions was:

- promoting a defence policy serving the self-defence of the state that does not pose a threat to the security of neighbouring countries,
- reforming military structures towards a new, subordinate role of the armed forces in democratic societies (a depoliticised army subordinated to the civil ministry of defence),
- promoting understanding of American defence policy,
- inspiring and helping to develop democratic values and ideals in the military environments of Central and Eastern European countries.

Also, essential, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme designed for allied and friendly countries. The IMET offered the opportunity to use a whole range of professional courses provided for the United States Armed Forces. IMET courses included:

- postgraduate studies (in war academies and command and staff academies),

- tactical and operational courses (in command and staff academies),
- specialised courses (organised in specific types of armed forces),
- linguistic courses (for English language instructors).

Additionally, the European Command of the United States of America began to organise exercises as part of the Partnership for Peace, to establish cooperation with individual AOR countries in the scientific and technical sphere. It should be emphasised that the programme oversaw the implementation of the Foreign Military Sale (FMS) implemented to facilitate the foreign sale of arms. This program was created in the 1960s and is implemented directly by the Defence Security Cooperation Agency (DSAA). The Americans conducted training in procedures regarding the sale of armaments and military equipment by the United States of America.⁷ Thus, through the United States European Command, Americans strengthened their position in Europe, Africa, and parts of the Middle East.

The Role of intelligence and counterintelligence services

Intelligence services are an important tool supporting both U.S. involvement in Europe and beyond, as well as the American concept of the European Security and Defence Identity. The United States of America has some of the most numerous and extensive special services in the world that play an extremely important role in the security policy planning and implementation process, providing information to decision-makers at various levels⁸, analysis⁹, and forecasts. Within the American intelligence services (Intelligence Community) there are also organisations collecting and analysing information that comes from public sources (press, official government documents, etc.). In the American defence system, intelligence

services often appear as an independent substantive entity, actively participating in the creation of security policy by presenting studies and analyses of a public or open nature (often reports of several hundred pages, published, or forwarded to Congress) or secret (reports for the president).

The United States of America intelligence service consists of several institutions with separate subordination, differing depending on the area of activity (e.g., satellite electronic intelligence) or specialisation (e.g., military intelligence). The basic organisation of American intelligence is the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), whose director is the honorary head and official spokesperson of the entire U.S. intelligence community. The CIA, founded in 1947, reports directly to the President and director, nominated by the head of state. It conducts operational (espionage) activities, acquires, and processes information, and analyses it. The analytical sphere and almost unprecedented technological intelligence have gained more and more importance. Electronic intelligence and special communication systems are dealt with by the National Security Agency (NSA), formally part of the Department of Defence (DoD). The NSA is responsible for monitoring foreign countries' communication. The director of the Central Intelligence Agency conducts substantive supervision over the NSA.

The National Bureau of Recognition (NRO), which is responsible for the operation of reconnaissance satellites and the analysis of data derived from them, is of key strategic importance. The NRO consumes the largest share of funds allocated to the maintenance of intelligence services. The office has considerable operational and administrative independence, and, like other intelligence institutions, is under the general supervision of the CIA director. The acquisition and analysis of strictly military information are done by the Defence Intelligence

Agency (DIA). It is part of the Department of Defence. DIA conducts agent activities. It is also responsible for the functioning of the U.S. military network of attachés in dozens of countries around the world. Also, the Defence Intelligence Agency is under the substantive supervision of the CIA director.¹⁰

Thus, as stated in the U.S. security strategy, the United States of America's intelligence capabilities are a key part of USA national strength and an integral instrument in the United States of America security strategy implementation. Intelligence services support U.S. military operations around the world, diplomatic efforts, to collect current information on foreign and future technologies and infrastructure. Besides, the strategy emphasises that gathering information and analysing business intelligence will play an increasingly important role in supporting decision-makers in identifying threats from foreign intelligence services to private enterprises, as well as unfair commercial practices. Improving intelligence management and focusing on issues that are at the centre of attention of military decision-makers and commanders increases the value of intelligence and contributes to the growth of U.S. prosperity.¹¹

The United Kingdom is a crucial partner of the United States of America in achieving the American goals. These special relations in the intelligence sphere have been going on since 1941 when American and British 'code breakers' began working together at Bletchley Park in England. Currently - because of concluded agreements - the intelligence services of both countries have designated tasks and areas of activity as well as the scope of responsibility, such as British listening positions in Cyprus, where there are no American positions.

Since 1948 the United States of America also had other strategic intelligence partners with whom it has precise agreements, including Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The

cooperation of five Anglo-Saxon countries has been institutionalised in the form of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC),¹² formed by the government of the United Kingdom. In addition, the United States of America also uses well-working tactical intelligence¹³ inside NATO. In turn, the country with which the United States of America in the field of intelligence had serious problems, especially in the ESDI context, is France. The ‘intelligence war’ between these countries has been going on for a long time. Particularly apparent in the early eighties, when the Americans began to raise the issue of French industrial espionage in the United States of America. The Gaullist Interior Minister Charles Pasque, in 1995 issued a public statement announcing the expulsion of groups of CIA officers from France, claiming that they were caught bribing high French officials (an attempt to obtain information on France’s position on GATT conversations). In addition, the European Parliament issued a report on U.S. industrial and economic espionage. It points to the United States of America has a global listening network that could capture two billion private conversations per day. It was also noted that the United Kingdom plays a central role in this system.¹⁴

France did not have such a coherent and ubiquitous listening network. However, it had similar listening stations, i.e., 15 listening stations located in French Guiana, New Caledonia, Reunion, and Djibouti. As the U.S. Department of Defence stated, they were very actively used to listening to the Department’s talks. In addition, French diplomacy has urged Europeans to build and develop their own military intelligence satellite network on various occasions. Especially in the period from the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty to the EU summit in December 1999 in Helsinki, the French tried to influence European leaders to build joint European intelligence and

analytical capabilities independent from the United States of America. As an indispensable component of the current Common European Security and Defence Policy. The Gulf War was an even more important incentive for building a common European intelligence policy than 'Maastricht'. Dependence on U.S. intelligence during the Gulf War further confirmed France's position on the need to improve autonomous capabilities common to other European countries, particularly in the field of intelligence.

European experience in Bosnia has again demonstrated the over-dependence of Western Europe on the United States of America. Although French diplomacy managed to obtain European support at the political level for building a European Common Intelligence Policy (CIP) this policy did not work. Accordingly, France has begun work on building and developing its network of military intelligence satellites. It was the Hélios program. Hélios 1 consisted of two satellites built by Matra Marconi Space for the French armaments agency Délégation Général pour L'Armement (DGA). Italy and Spain have joined this program. The first Hélios satellite, Hélios 1A, was launched in July 1995. Hélios 1B was launched in December 1999. Many French defence analysts felt that spending nearly EUR 2 billion on Helios 1 was a good investment. However, Hélios 1's contribution to the European Common Intelligence Policy was limited. Analysts emphasised that thanks to Helios 2, France and its European allies will become a satellite power.

During the Franco-German summit in Nuremberg in December 1996, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President Jacques Chirac agreed on the need for strategic intelligence capabilities. This was a clear reference to Hélios 2, a military observation satellite.¹⁵ In response, President Bill Clinton began a mission to prevent the French concept of

independence of Europeans from American satellites. The president gave John Deutch the head of the CIA in Germany a special mission to meet Chancellor Kohl and to convince him to buy American strategic products. Deutch, tasked with maintaining American control over Europe, offered Germany buying cheaper Lockheed spy satellites instead of investing in Hélios. As a result, in 1997 Germany decided not to continue working on the Hélios 2 program under French leadership. Thus, the French concept did not come true.

The ‘intelligence war’ between France and the United States of America developed due to the various political and commercial interests. In which the French oppose American domination of the world lasted. In this fight, France within the European Union emphasised that it was impossible to build the second pillar (Common Foreign and Security Policy) without having its intelligence satellites independent of the United States of America. In addition, France has begun to ensure that the Military Staff being formed within the European Union also performs the function of military intelligence.¹⁶

For the European CIP to be effective, it would need to be able to provide intelligence quickly and accurately to the armed forces. These abilities were to be decisive for the success of the European Common Intelligence Policy. They could be achieved by building a European C3I system (Communication, Command, Control, and Information). At that time, the European C3I construction, independent from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and the United States of America’s C3I capabilities and their infrastructure were not possible.¹⁷ To effectively counteract various threats that could weaken the United States of America’s position in the world, the Department of Defence counterintelligence (CI) together with the FBI and the CIA developed a new strategy, called CI 21. To implement CI 21, the

administration was to be equipped with a Board CI director, headed by the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and consisting of the deputy secretary of defence, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and a high-ranking official from the Department of Justice. The board was to appoint the National Executive Body of CI. This new leadership program at the time was meant to give the Department of Defence an unprecedented opportunity to protect its secrets and put more emphasis on the capabilities of all national forces of CI. Besides, the Department of Defence sought to extend support for the protection of key technologies. The new Joint Counter-Intelligence Training Academy (JCITA) provided the operational capability and the innovative Joint CI Analyst Group (JCAG) operational analysis.¹⁸

2. Strategic partnership

In the new strategic partnership vision, emerged the united and integrated Europe concept – ‘whole and free’. In a lasting alliance with the United States of America. This vision of a partnership between the U.S. and Europe was based on the principle of equality, which should reconcile two tasks at the same time: ensuring security in Europe and safeguarding other common interests. This vision deviates from the motivation of the Atlantic Alliance during the Cold War. This is no longer a vision based on the thesis that the U.S. is to be a defender and Europe needs defence. Now the Alliance relied on the premise that the United States of America and Europe share common vital interests both within and outside Europe. Thinking in these categories went beyond the narrow limits of the Cold War doctrine, which reduced NATO’s tasks to suppressing Soviet

attempts at Western Europe, and if necessary - defending the West against invasion from the East.¹⁹

The then U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher on October 6, 1996, in Stuttgart presented the vision of the United States of America for the 21st century - the 'New Atlantic Community'. He emphasised that the U.S. would remain a political and military force in Europe. In the New Atlantic Community, the United States of America was to be fully involved in working with friends and allies, and more effectively with the European Union. In this community, the U.S. was to remain an essential pillar of common security. The secretary pointed to the new NATO, which was to adapt to emerging challenges with the full participation of all allies. Europe and the U.S., he said, will participate in joint actions against global threats. Warren Christopher stated that thanks to the Partnership for Peace, it is now possible to shape a true, broad European military coalition. He also emphasised that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation provides the basis for building the New Atlantic Community, in which all of Europe and North America cooperate in strengthening lasting security. Close political cooperation in the European Union and its future enlargement were to contribute to the New Atlantic Community security and prosperity. The U.S. was interested to play a significant role in the institutions of European security and economic cooperation. Christopher also strongly emphasised that the common challenge in building the New Atlantic Community is to promote the well-being of both sides and spread it on a global scale. The United States of America and Europe are expanding economic relations in the world. The U.S. and Europe must move towards freedom and opening the transatlantic market. The Secretary of State emphasised that the open trade and investment in the New Atlantic Community must be a broad part of the vision. In other

words, it must cover Central Europe and the newly independent states, including Russia. It was one of the reasons for the United States of America's strong support for the European Union's enlargement program.²⁰

U.S. Ambassador to NATO Alexander Vershbow stressed that the European Security and Defence Identity is part of a wider transatlantic project.²¹ Europe, the United States of America, and Canada share a common heritage and close historical, political, economic, and cultural ties. Transatlantic solidarity is essential for maintaining peace and freedom and strengthening an undivided, free, and democratic Europe. The free trade and broad economic exchange, the increase in the flow of goods, services, technologies, and ideas, make transatlantic relations an effective framework for cooperation and the free economies development.

The Transatlantic Declaration on Cooperation between the United States of America and the European Community agreed by both sides on November 23, 1990, was an important document on broadly defined transatlantic relations that go beyond security and defence issues. In this document, the USA and the European Community declared that they would face transatlantic challenges in the interest of their societies and the rest of the world. Both sides also agreed that appropriate procedures are needed for regular and intensive consultation. They stated that they would make full use of existing procedures, including those established on February 27, 1990, by the President of the European Council and the President of the United States of America.²² It was about bilateral consultations organised alternately in the USA and Europe.

As the then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said in her statement to the North Atlantic Council, the United States of America and Europe should establish more effective

mechanisms, achieving interests in Europe and beyond.²³ In turn, President Bill Clinton on May 13, 1998, in Berlin said that the U.S. remains with Europe because, no less than 50 years ago, the fate of the U.S. and Europe are common. If there is peace in Europe, the United States of America be more secure.²⁴

The Political and military aspect

Transatlantic ties expressed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation continue to have a decisive impact on Europe's security. In November 1991, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adopted a new strategic concept that confirmed the importance of transatlantic ties. However, during the Brussels summit in January 1994, NATO leaders agreed that the emergence of European Security and Defence Identity would strengthen both the European Alliance's pillar and transatlantic ties.²⁵ As the resolution adopted by the United States Senate says, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is the only institution that promotes unique transatlantic perspectives and approaches to problems related to the interests and security of the United States of America and Europe. The USA and Europe have a fundamental interest in the security and stability of Europe as a whole.²⁶ Much depends on how European strategic autonomy develops. It seems that correctly oriented, with close cooperation and transparency of relations between NATO and the European Union, could strengthen transatlantic ties and the capacity for more effective crisis management. Otherwise, it may contribute to the destruction of transatlantic ties. Therefore, it was necessary to strengthen this project so that it could be put on the right track from the beginning.

Part of the U.S. Senate has proposed that the United States of America build a new 'division of labour' in which European allies will deal with European security and the U.S. - security

outside Europe. According to Stephen Larrabee of Rand Corporation, this idea is bad and dangerous. It would violate the transatlantic relations and could lead to a weakening of the U.S. role in Europe.²⁷ The United States of America should fight for a new transatlantic agreement, based on which they will maintain their commitment to Europe. While encouraging allies to take greater responsibility for security in Europe, but also beyond. ESDI could contribute to such a new transatlantic agreement, provided it is well-targeted.

As Lisa Bronson, assistant secretary of defence for European relations and NATO points out, we should strive to complement the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Union. In this regard, Bronson emphasised that a common vision must be found for both the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. Also, she said that some were afraid that cooperation within NATO could mean compliance with U.S. policies and doctrines. Lisa Bronson asked the question of whether the Common European Security and Defence Policy is primarily a political undertaking, the last stage in the process of full integration of Europe, or is it an instrument in solving the real problems of security in Europe? If CESDP is primarily a political endeavour, then more emphasis will be placed on institution-building than on building new capacity. It will be dangerous and can lead to tensions in transatlantic relations. However, if the Common European Security and Defence Policy is an instrument in solving the problems of European security, then Europe will gain new dynamics. In this case, the EU should opt for cooperation with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. It will strengthen the construction of the European Alliance's pillar. According to Bronson, this should not be a zero-sum game. The United States of America has a genuine interest in the success of

CESDP and Europe's growing responsibility within the North Atlantic Alliance.²⁸

Douglas Bereuter from the House of Representatives on February 22, 2000, stressed that complementary rather than duplication of NATO efforts and institutions, the active involvement of all European allies, rather than discrimination against those who are not members of the European Union are required.²⁹ In a resolution adopted by the U.S. Senate on October 28, 1999, the United States of America urged the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Union to lay down principles that would strengthen and harmonise the transatlantic partnership. Besides, it was necessary to improve European military capabilities not using new institutions outside the Alliance, but through more dynamic and influential actions implementing ESDI within North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Failure of the U.S.'s European allies to achieve the goals set by DCI would weaken the foundations of the Alliance in the United States of America. The resolution also called on the president, secretary of state, and secretary of defence to make full use of his offices to support U.S. allies in NATO. The European Union, implementing its decisions, should not NATO resources and capabilities duplicate.³⁰

On September 25, 2000, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO Alexander Vershbow in the Atlantic Committee in Oslo said that achieving the ESDI goals and the Common European Security and Defence Policy would require appropriate measures. For a longer period, it will be important for members of the European Union to maintain close cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in the field of defence planning. The intent was to strengthen both organisations while allowing them to achieve maximum benefits from defence resources. Alliance and EU members must work together to avoid unnecessary

duplication in some areas. If NATO and the European Union build their power separately, it will weaken the Alliance's overall ability to deal with major crises and create new political misunderstandings in transatlantic relations.³¹

As Cohen emphasised at a press conference during an informal NATO ministerial meeting in Birmingham on October 10, 2000, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and European Union security planning should be combined, in such a way as to increase joint capabilities rather than duplicate efforts. He stated that the United States of America does not want to see bureaucracy in the form of separate and independent planning from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.³² At a meeting of NATO defence ministers, on December 2, 1999, the U.S. administration official noted that European Security and Defence Identity must be compatible with DCI.³³ The deputy secretary of state for European relations Marc Grossman said to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on March 9, 2000, that ESDI would be good for the Alliance, U.S. interests, and U.S.-Europe relations. Besides, the European Security and Defence Identity should be built in the spirit of the '3I' concept: improvement of capabilities, the indivisibility of security structures, inclusion of all allies (improvement of capabilities, the indivisibility of security structures, inclusiveness of all Allies)³⁴.

The proper NATO-EU relations were to strengthen organisational decisions regarding the future of military operations. The ability of European U.S. partners to create new military capabilities would depend on ESDI's success. The new structures of the European Union were to cooperate fully with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The European Security and Defence Identity and CESDP were to strengthen the Alliance. NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson and EU High Representative Javier Solana shared these views. Much also

depended on the European Union candidates from Eastern Europe at the time. As Secretary of State Albright said on January 26, 2000, 'the choice between America and Europe is a false choice'. Building real new capabilities is difficult, expensive, and time-consuming. Without this, however, there will be neither European Security and Defence Identity, nor CESDP, nor 'Headline Goal'. The Alliance will be weak. ESDI, Albright emphasised, could foster joint defence, alleviate the U.S. burden, and strengthen the transatlantic partnership, which is very important for U.S. national security.³⁵

In the same discussion in the Senate, Franklin Kramer, deputy secretary of defence for international security, stated that Defence CI and European Security and Defence Identity must be consistent. Both Defence Capability Initiative and ESDI initiatives will fail if nations do not act more vigorously. NATO resources should, in practice, be available to the European Union. Besides, Kramer said that the European Security and Defence Identity should build relations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Western European Union, providing CFSP with mechanisms ensuring access to NATO resource planning as well as capabilities for operations conducted by the European Union. Close coordination and transparency in planning between NATO and the European Union were to be very important.³⁶ After reviewing the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, Strobe Talbott, deputy secretary of state, at the NAC meeting in Brussels on December 15, 1999, emphasise Defence Capability Initiative and efforts to establish ESDI. In his opinion, the NATO military campaign in Kosovo revealed a big gap between the military capabilities of the United States of America and Europe. It is in the interest of every nation represented in the NAC that this gap should be reduced.³⁷ Without effective consultation, the Alliance would

simply not be able to fulfil its tasks. In his opinion, the key in this respect will be the implementation of DCI. It could enable more efficient forces distribution. In addition, Vershbow stressed that it is impossible to build a European Security and Defence Identity successfully without strengthening NATO and vice versa.³⁸ In October later that year, Ambassador Vershbow while speaking at the Centre for European Studies in Waterloo pointed out that both organisations could not afford to follow separate paths in matters of security. If NATO and the European Union do not work together on defence planning, this can lead to rivalry or even conflicts between members within both organisations. The consequence would be the Alliance's generally weak capacity to deal with major crises, including new political misunderstandings in transatlantic relations.

The U.S. supported the European Union's pursuit of its defence capabilities - CESDP - because without them Europe is less able to prevent crises through diplomatic means, which in the U.S. is referred to as 'power-supported diplomacy'.³⁹ The United States of America supported European integration. Building an effective Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, of which CESDP is one of the components, which was to allow, as a result, greater coherence, predictability, and a more effective European response to challenges and crises around the world. The goal of the European Union for tomorrow is by building strategic autonomy to become an effective global player in the arena of foreign and security policy, just like today in trade and financial matters. Some Europeans have criticized the U.S. for acting as a global gendarme by taking unilateral actions where they should not be involved. If CESDP succeeds, it will help the U.S. determine when and where it should be involved. By consulting with its allies, the United States of America could reach an agreement on the action taken. Together

they were to decide which institutions or countries, or group of countries would be a more effective actor, able to take various actions necessary to solve the crisis.⁴⁰

The 'Report on European Strategy' was published in the Pentagon on December 1, 2000, acknowledging that 'technical' issues such as the defence planning process are not enough. It is about the existence of an entire strategic structure, including both NATO and the European Union. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation remains the most important guarantor of security in Europe. The Report indicates that the coordination of the operational forces must take place at the NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).⁴¹ Kim R. Holmes argued that a new strategic agreement is needed to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance. He thought so for two reasons. First, the U.S. and Europe built separate visions of the world. These different visions draw different conclusions about international security, trade, and law. Secondly, the inequality of costs related to security must have resulted in Europe starting to 'undermine' its presence in Europe. Differences in human rights, international law, and international security are not the only sources of tension between Europe and the U.S. International trade is another problem. For example, the European Union began trying to limit imports of U.S. modified foods, even if there was no obvious evidence that it was harmful. The European Union wanted to protect its agricultural market in this way. 83% of all subsidies in the world fall on the EU's Common Agricultural Policy. European agriculture is highly subsidised. The misunderstandings in U.S.-EU relations were not the result of American unilateralism or European ingratitude. The U.S. has always been inclined to act unilaterally, while most Europeans have always been in favour of bilateral action and opposed American dominance in the Atlantic Alliance. Rather, the

contradiction is due to the political shift that has occurred in transatlantic relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Europeans spend very little on defence because they want to defend the European welfare state model. Western European governments wanted to meet the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty by limiting government spending. The largest cuts are made in defence budgets. The solution, however, was to liberalize their economies, just as the United States and the United Kingdom did. In contrast, France, Germany, and other continental European countries insisted on the welfare state system.

Europeans have complained that American leadership has become unilateral and based more on America's 'ignorance' rather than American foreign policy. Increasingly, American efforts to confirm global leadership have encountered resentment and resistance in Europe. In this context, the introduction of the euro, Common Foreign and Security Policy, and CESDP should be understood. The motivation for the euro and CFSP was to make Europe more independent from the U.S. and to improve the outlook for Europe's global role. The single European currency, which can compete with the dollar, was conceived not only as a factor in the growing importance of the European economy in the world but also to be an element supporting the growth of the global political role of the European Union.⁴² Holmes did not think this situation would persist. It can last if the level of danger in Europe is relatively low. At some point, however, the contradiction in the heart of the Atlantic Alliance will become unbearable. Holmes believed that U.S.-EU relations did not have a stable basis. Despite the long history of joint actions, interests, and values, Holmes was worried that the continuation of the current direction could lead to a point of no exit or the collapse of the Atlantic Alliance. He thought, however, that this terrible

vision could be avoided. Throughout his professional life, he was a supporter of NATO. He argued, however, that one should start thinking completely differently about what the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is. An agreement between the U.S. and Europe was needed. It should be more realistic and reflect the Alliance benefits and costs. Moreover, to reaffirm the different U.S. and EU interests not only in Europe but around the world. In turn, John Hulsman, a senior European affairs analyst at the Heritage Foundation, pointed out a new concept that, according to Holmes, could solve the problem of bearing costs. Hulsman, like Kim Holmes, demanded a 'great deal', in which the U.S. could transfer more power to Europeans in NATO, and in return, Europeans would incur higher costs on their defence. If Europeans modernise their armed forces by increasing defence spending to 3% of their total domestic product, the U.S. could agree to restructure NATO's command in Europe. For example, some operational headquarters with the southern headquarters in Naples could be transferred to Europeans. On the other hand, the U.S. involvement in the joint defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation could remain at the same level. However, Europeans did not intend to take on greater costs in the field of defence. In these conditions, there was nothing to say about changing their position within the Alliance.⁴³

During the summit on December 17, 1999, the U.S. and European Union agreed that it states that partner relations between the parties are developing most dynamically in the world and are very important on a global scale. Regarding institution development and CFSP implementation, both sides agreed to expand consultation, cooperation, and transparency between the European Union and NATO. It is worth emphasising that the United States and the European Union have confirmed their support for the transatlantic dialogue development in

various areas at the non-governmental level to ensure greater public participation in mutual relations.⁴⁴ As demanded by John C. Hulsman, the European pillar must increase its financial, and military participation in NATO. The United States of America must agree to strengthen Europe's role, as the benefits of increased involvement of European funds in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation will reduce the U.S. defence burden. There is no doubt that the change in NATO's command structures was mainly an American concession. The overall agreement was to allow the U.S. to bear global responsibility without sacrificing its commitment to Europe.⁴⁵

In summary, three main aspects of this problem can be identified. The first - military - includes European Security and Defence Identity and DCI. The second - economic and commercial - concerned strengthening the cooperation of the defence industry. Third, political, which required intensified efforts of all structures and organisations of the Atlantic Community, including the European Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. European Security and Defence Identity were to help non-EU allies in shaping planning and making decisions about military operations conducted by the European Union. Besides, the United States of America was open to cooperation between defence companies on both sides of the Atlantic.

The Political and economic aspect

The document developed by the Department of Defence emphasises that Europe is an indispensable economic partner of the United States of America and will remain so in the 21st century. U.S. Ambassador to Vienna Kathryn Walt Hall, speaking about the U.S. - Europe relations said that a common goal is a key element of the transatlantic partnership. Half of the world's goods production and services were in the USA or the

European Union. He emphasised the fact that the United States of America and Western European countries have been developing a system of rules for the global economy for 50 years. This system is currently reflected in the WTO. At the Seattle ministerial conference, the emphasis was placed on world trade problems that are of major importance to both the European Union and the United States of America. During the meeting, not only the division of opinions was made.⁴⁶

The WTO is a system that in the last half-century allowed the reduction of tariffs by 90%. It favoured the growth of world trade. Therefore, Europe and the USA should be more partners than rivals. Their cooperation creates global prosperity. The more so because both sides have a special responsibility to maintain growth and preserve the free market. The United States of America is determined to build a partnership in the 21st century together with Europe. The liberal international economic order is defined as the system of currency and trade systems in force in the modern world. It includes a combination of rules, norms, and decision-making procedures that limit government intervention in the global economy and accelerate the free flow of capital and goods across national borders. The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organisation (formerly GATT) play a very important institutional role in maintaining liberal international economic order. However, the United States of America's power provided relative stability and effective functioning of the currency and trade system. In the above-mentioned institutions, the USA has the greatest influence, and thus may also exert pressure on other countries through them.⁴⁷ Douglas Eden asked whether the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) could be used to limit American access to European markets, including the sphere of defence? Responding, he said that if European cooperation was needed, it was to revive global

trade. However, this recovery may not come if global U.S. policy neglects European interests or if the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries discriminate against the EU in accessing Western hemisphere markets.

1999 was a milestone in the history of transatlantic relations. The basic institution of these relations - NATO - expanded to the East for the first time since the reunification of Germany. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, according to Eden, has always been more than just a defence organisation. From 1949, it was a supranational institution representing American involvement in Europe. According to Eden, the new NATO would be an 'alliance of interests' of North America and Europe, protecting their interests from various existing and potential problems and threats in Europe and beyond. Eden emphasised, however, that the long-lasting feature of transatlantic relations is that U.S. security guarantees for Europe legitimize U.S. access to European markets,⁴⁸ especially during the period of still ongoing mergers of American companies, which are creating giants with global reach. Two-thirds of the 250 largest in the world corporations were based in the United States of America. The first five places on this list were taken by American companies: Microsoft, General Electric, Intel, IBM, Cisco Systems. In mid-November 1999, the amendment to the Glass-Steagall Act, in force since 1933, prohibited the merger of banks, insurance companies, and brokerage houses. Changes in the banking law have opened the way for mega fusions between large American banks and insurance companies, which will contribute to the emergence of so-called financial supermarkets offering a very wide range of services.⁴⁹

On April 20, 2000, at the French Institute of International Relations in Paris, the U.S. Ambassador to the European Union, Richard Morningstar, pointed out that the major problem of both

economies is that both sides do not work together. There are differences of opinion on both sides of the Atlantic, Morningstar argued that the U.S. and Europe are major competitors on the world market, not partners. In the United States of America, Europe is often discredited as a region that has relied on America for too long. In Europe, in turn, was argued that the U.S. was not its friend at all, but rather an arrogant superpower, determined to dominate the world, a hegemon, not an ally. According to the U.S. ambassador to the European Union, such accusations are unfounded. It cannot be a hegemon and isolationist at the same time. Morningstar believed that the creation of one market in Europe was caused by the fact that Europe wanted to stop the rapid influx of transnational American companies. For this reason, Europe needed the euro, partly to deprive the U.S. of 'unfair advantage'. In his opinion, CESDP was necessary to fight for the emancipation of Europe. Besides, it is no less important than it is thanks to the United States of America and Europe that the global economy is constantly growing. At the time, both sides provided over 50% of global GDP. Their cooperation can still be the engine of the global economy.⁵⁰

During a meeting in May 2000 at the NAC at the level of Foreign Ministers in Florence, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright announced a new initiative to improve U.S. cooperation with their trade allies in the defence industry. This initiative pointed to actions aimed at increasing the export of defence articles to NATO countries.⁵¹ As the arms market shrinks, competition between arms suppliers has naturally increased. From the point of view of the prospects of the European defence industry, a decisive factor is competition on the transatlantic axis and obtaining by EU companies' wider access to the hermetic American market than before. The Madeleine Albright initiative was a response to the new challenges related to merging

European defence companies into larger structures, thus having significantly better marketing opportunities. The problem of access to markets was an important element of American-European competition.

The British Aerospace (Bae) concern was a significant centre of capital consolidation of defence companies. In January 1999, BAE merged with GEC Marconi, which is the military part of the General Electric Company. The merger of Bae and GEC was a kind of industry response to the declarations of consolidation of the European defence industry, made many times by heads of government of the EU countries, which would allow it to better prepare for competition with American corporations. Arms sector-leading representatives also supported the idea of merging their companies. Thanks to which the concept of creating a single European Aerospace and Defence Company (EADC) could become a reality in the future.

Referring to the initiative of the Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, there was a discussion about whether the consolidation of the defence industry would be strictly European and be carried out without significant participation of U.S. companies, or whether this process should have a transatlantic dimension. Of course, American companies were in favour of the latter solution and wanted to participate as much as possible in the European arms market, whose value was estimated at USD 50 billion.⁵² The foreign expansion of corporations with the predominance of American capital contributes to the growth of the United States of America. Secretary of State stressed that the freedom, prosperity, and security of both sides are increasingly converging. Thanks to the close cooperation of the United States of America and the European Union, the transatlantic community has become the engine of world progress. The EU Common Foreign and Security Policy were to help form the necessary 'real

partnership' in which Europe can count on America and America can count on Europe. This would overcome the dangers both inside and outside the transatlantic community.⁵³

3. The North Atlantic Alliance in the process of European integration

The North Atlantic Alliance enlargement has become a crucial element of the American concept of the European Security and Defence Identity implementation. Due to the conviction of the U.S. administration that new members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation will guarantee the development of ESDI within the structures of the North Atlantic Alliance. The enlargement of the Alliance has also increased and consolidated - to a certain extent - American influence in Europe. The position of the United States of America, which was eventually followed by other member states, was of fundamental importance for the NATO enlargement process. In September 1994, before the election to Congress, the North Atlantic Alliance enlargement postulate was included in the so-called Contract with America, the Republican Party election platform. In the autumn of 1994, the Democratic Party also introduced the postulate of NATO enlargement to its program. The placement of this postulate in the electoral programs of two major political parties was the result of several factors: the support of American public opinion, traditional economic, cultural, and ideological ties with the 'Old Continent' and the way of understanding the American national interest and the role of this country in the world.⁵⁴

Resolution S.RES.175 adopted on August 5, 1999, by the U.S. Senate, states that NATO ensures U.S. leadership. European. The accession of Poland, the Czech Republic, and

Hungary to the North Atlantic Alliance on 12 March 1999 strengthened the Alliance. It was an important step towards a truly undivided and free Europe, a peaceful Europe. In addition, the resolution emphasises that because of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation enlargement, the United States of America's sphere of influence has expanded.⁵⁵ The U.S. Senate's support for NATO enlargement meant maintaining the United States of America's presence in Europe. The enlargement debate has shown that both the U.S. and Europe are interested in maintaining transatlantic cooperation in the field of security and that the U.S. still feels responsible for strengthening peace and stability on the European continent. The United States of America held NATO leadership firmly in their hands and remains a decisive force in the Alliance. The result of voting in the U.S. Senate was proof of the victory of internationalists over isolationists led by J. Helms. Therefore, the United States of America was not eliminated from international military organisations and the emerging idea of responsibility for the entire hemisphere was wasted. The Senate's decision also laid the foundations for modifying NATO's role, transforming from a defence alliance into a kind of continental security alliance or continental rapid action force. When considering the motives of the U.S. Senate, supporting the Alliance's expansion to the East, one cannot ignore the pressure of the American arms lobby, which promises to profit.⁵⁶

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation enlargement was crucial in B. Clinton's thinking about security policy. Some commentators emphasised that enlargement supports the United States of America's presence in Europe at a time when European cooperation and the EMU are strengthening. Covering NATO with three new countries was thus meant to strengthen U.S. involvement abroad, and at a time when foreign policy does not

have a special place in U.S. policy. The Senate's decision with 80 votes in favour and 19 against was the most radical change in U.S. global policy since the collapse of the USSR. The enlargement of the Alliance was also a way of strengthening strategic influence and security policy in Europe. All this happened at a time when strong economic cooperation within the European Union gave rise to a new challenge for American domination in the world. Bill Clinton treated the result of voting in the Senate as an important milestone on the road to an undivided, democratic, and war-free Europe.

President Bill Clinton's decision to expand NATO was the answer to the question about the U.S. military and political presence in Europe. The North Atlantic Alliance is a unique organisation with a transatlantic dimension, thanks to which there are permanent ties between the United States of America and Europe. As noted by Zbigniew Brzezinski, NATO strengthens the political influence and military power of the United States of America on the Eurasian continent. In a situation of the still high dependence of European nations on the U.S. umbrella, every extension of Europe's political reach is automatically an extension of American influence. Covering the Central European countries through the Alliance enlargement was not only the American values in foreign policy implementation. But also, a way for the organisation to survive and remain Americans in Europe. 'The White House may have advanced erosion of American influence', said former Ambassador in the U.S. Kazimierz Dziewanowski. Leaving the Central European countries' integration with the West, only the European Union, would mean condemning NATO to marginalisation and gradual disintegration. The Central and Eastern European countries' inclusion in the North Atlantic

Alliance was in the interest of the United States of America. It strengthened the Atlantic option in it.⁵⁷

NATO embodied the United States of America's presence in Europe. It was to allow not only to prevent conflicts in this part of Europe but also to preserve peace in Eastern Europe by preventing competition for influence between Russia and Germany, which could pose a threat to European security. NATO enlargement was therefore seen to this end. By accepting new members, the USA would do for Eastern Europe what it had already done for Western Europe: as a result, the war in this part of Europe seems unlikely. The United States of America is very interesting to use the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to foster European integration, as they also strengthen its position in Europe. If the U.S. goal remains to integrate Europe with the help of NATO, then it could not be limited to only three countries that have already joined the Alliance. Robert Zoellick, a former U.S. official, claimed that NATO enlargement was a wise move that would serve USA interests in three ways:

- 1) The United States of America has an interest in consolidating security and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, a region that has been the area of rivalry between Germany and Russia for centuries. It's time to end this tragic heritage. This region must finally cease to be someone's sphere of influence;
- 2) Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary will be loyal U.S. allies in solving future problems. These countries know the price of freedom, are sensitive to their security, appreciate the importance of friendship with the United States of America and their impact on peace and security. Over time, the armed forces of these countries will strengthen NATO's potential, and likely develop the deepest loyalties towards the USA;

3) Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary will provide a convenient platform for influencing the East, including Russia. Making concessions in relations with the new Russia would be a very serious mistake. However, one cannot ignore the possibility of establishing cooperation with her, but it is up to the Russians themselves whether in their policy they will be guided by the logic of the 21st century, or the logic of the 19th century when it was in the interest of the powers to surround themselves with weak states. The situation at the time was the opposite: it was in the interest of individual countries that their neighbours were stable, democratic, and prosperous, because only then did they not transfer their problems to neighbouring countries (this involves immigration, crime, etc.).⁵⁸

By its decision, the Senate confirmed that the U.S. intends to continue to play an active role in Europe. The consent of the Senate was a great success of President Clinton, who from 1994 tried to admit some former communist countries to NATO.⁵⁹ Jesse Helms, chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, said that linking Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary's membership in NATO with their membership in the European Union is inappropriate - it would mean giving up the USA leadership role in Europe. French farmers do not decide about American security interests. The membership of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary was not only not to weaken the Alliance and its basic mission, which is the mutual defence of the members' territory, but on the contrary - to strengthen it. These countries know best how much independence is worth. According to Holmes, these three countries will be one of the most loyal allies. They want to be in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, but the U.S. also needs them in the Alliance. These countries were to be among the first to stand alongside the

United States of America at a time of crisis and to support U.S. efforts to ensure that NATO's current role is maintained in the future.⁶⁰

Behind the American decision to expand the North Atlantic Alliance were primarily economic (American investments), cultural (70% of Americans come from Europe), ideologically (similar value system), and of course, political, and prestigious. Foreign direct investment flowing into the European Union from the U.S. in 1999 amounted to EUR 197 billion, i.e., 66.1% of the funds invested by the U.S. in the world in 1999. During the same period, the European Union companies invested 75.3 billion euros in the United States of America. In 2000, USA exports to the European Union amounted to EUR 197 billion, while imports reached EUR 232.7 billion⁶¹, with exports of \$ 1 billion worth of goods in the United States, on average, 20,000 well-paid jobs. Considering the problems of American business, according to Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, it is impossible to separate NATO from forty-five years of favourable transatlantic trade, even when only part of this trade was defence oriented. Therefore, serious national interests spoke in favour of the American military presence in Europe, even though Congress and American public opinion were not always aware of it. Then, the debate on the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance was a discussion on the role of the United States of America in the world.⁶²

The American entrepreneur, the owner of the Ben & Jerry company, emphasised that the debate on the enlargement of NATO was related to marketing, and more specifically to the search for new outlets by American arms producers.⁶³ It is worth noting that American weapons manufacturers, companies such as Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, and McDonnell Douglas, have been very seriously financially involved in lobbying for NATO enlargement. In a situation where global

arms markets have shrunk rapidly; Central Europe has become a potential new recipient of U.S. arms. Nobody claims that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has expanded due to pressure from armaments companies. Representatives of these concerns were among the most committed the administration allies in promoting the enlargement of the Alliance. It is worth mentioning that Bruce Jackson, director of strategic planning at Lockheed, was also the head of the U.S. Committee to Expand NATO. Besides, some senators admitted that they became the target of lobbying activities of defence companies during the debate on NATO enlargement.⁶⁴

Notes

¹ D.B. Bobrow, E. Haliżak, R. Zięba (ed.): *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe i międzynarodowe u schyłku XXI wieku*, Warszawa 1997, p. 166.

² *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, May 1997.

³ Geographical area allocated to the strategic command.

⁴ The area of interest of the commander regarding the objectives of current or planned operations, including his areas of influence, activities and/or responsibilities, and areas of responsibility.

⁵ *Strengthening Transatlantic Security: A U.S. Strategy for the 21st Century*, DoD, December 2000, p. 44.

⁶ *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, 2001, p. 30.

⁷ *Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate One Hundred Sixth Congress*, First Session, April 21, 1999.

⁸ Any raw facts (phenomena) or descriptions that can be used to develop intelligence/intelligence data.

⁹ In intelligence/reconnaissance activity, an element of the information processing phase during which it is subjected to an examination to determine significant facts and their subsequent interpretations.

¹⁰ K. Piątkowski, *Polityka bezpieczeństwa i siły zbrojne USA*, Studia i Materiały BPI MON, Warszawa 1995, pp. 32-34.

¹¹ D.B. Bobrow, E. Haliżak, R. Zięba (red.): *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe i międzynarodowe u schyłku XXI wieku*, Warszawa 1997, p. 166.

¹² *Strengthening Transatlantic Security: A U.S. Strategy for the 21st Century*, DoD, December 2000, p.58.

¹³ Recognition is necessary for planning and conducting tactical operations.

¹⁴ *Le Monde*, 23 Février 2000.

¹⁵ W.L. Pforzheimer, A. Winner, *Prospects for a European Common Intelligence Policy*, Studies in Intelligence, CIA, Summer 2000, No. 9, Unclassified edition.

¹⁶ *Strengthening Transatlantic Security: A U.S. Strategy for the 21st Century*, DoD, December 2000, p. 69.

¹⁷ W.L. Pforzheimer, A. Winner, *Prospects for a European Common Intelligence Policy*, Studies in Intelligence, CIA, Summer 2000, No. 9, Unclassified edition.

¹⁸ *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defence, 2001, p. 118.

¹⁹ R.D. Asmus, NATO, *Koncepcja Bezpieczeństwa w XXI wieku*, Warszawa 1997, p.17.

²⁰ *A New Atlantic Community for the 21st Century*, Speech by Warren Christopher, Stuttgart, 6 October 1996.

²¹ *Next steps on European Security and Defense: A U.S. view*, Remarks by Ambassador Alexander Vershbow U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council at a conference on *The Development of the Common European Security and Defense Policy: The Integration Project of the Next Decade*. Organized by the Institute for European Policy (Bonn and Berlin), December 17, 1999.

²² *EU-US Partnership, Transatlantic Declaration*, 22.11.1990.

²³ *Secretary of State Albright Statement before the North Atlantic Council Ministerial*, Luxemburg City, Luxemburg, 05.28.98.

²⁴ *Strengthening Transatlantic Security: A U.S. Strategy for the 21st Century*, DoD, December 2000, p. 6.

²⁵ *Bezpieczeństwo europejskie: wspólna koncepcja 27 państw UZE*, „Studia i Materiały BPI MON” No. 36, Warszawa 1996, p. 25.

²⁶ *Resolution in the Senat of the United States - S.RES.175*, August 5, 1999.

²⁷ *Prepared Statement of F. Stephen Larrabee, The European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and American Interests*, RAND Washington, D.C., March 9, 2000.

²⁸ Occasional Paper 17, Paris Transatlantic Forum, *European defence – European and American perceptions*, Institut for Security Studies, July 2000, p. 6.

²⁹ *Outline of American (U.S.) Perspective on the Creation of the ESDI Within the European Union* by Douglas Bereuter, U.S. House of Representatives, February 22, 2000.

³⁰ *Resolution in the Senate of the United States – S.RES 208*, October 28, 1999.

³¹ *The United States, NATO, and Europe: Building a More Balanced Partnership*, Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, Oslo, Norway, September 25, 2000.

³² *Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen (press conference following NATO informal ministerial meeting in Birmingham, England)*, October 10, 2000.

³³ *Transcript of Press Conference by Secretary of Defence William Cohen*, NATO HQ, 2 December 1999.

³⁴ U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Marc Grossman on NATO, European Security, and Defense, Washington, 09 March 2000 (1,720).

³⁵ U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Marc Grossman *Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on European Affairs* Washington, D.C., March 9, 2000.

³⁶ *Testimony of the honorable Franklin D. Kramer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for international security affairs to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on European Affairs*, March 9, 2000.

³⁷ *The State of the Alliance: An America Perspective* by Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State, North Atlantic Council, Brussels, Belgium, December 15, 1999.

³⁸ Ambassador Alexander R. Vershbow U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, *Continuity, Clarity, and Constructive Change: NATO's Strategic Concept at the Start of the 21st Century*, Geneva Center for Security Policy, Geneva, January 27, 2000.

³⁹ *European Defense and NATO: A Vision of the future NATO-EU relationship*, Ambassador Alexander Vershbow U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council Centre d'Etudes Europeennes de Waterloo, Belgium, October 19, 2000.

⁴⁰ Address at Harvard Center for European Studies by Richard Morningstar, U.S. Ambassador to the European Union, *European Defense: End of Alliance or new partnership?* October 13, 2000.

⁴¹ *Kramer briefs on European Strategy, ESDI*, NATO meeting, December 1, 2000.

⁴² See: S. Talbot, *America's Stake in a Strong Europe*, Remarks at a Conference on the Future of NATO, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, October 7, 1999.

⁴³ K. Holmes, *The United States, and Europe in the 21st Century: Partners or Competitors?* The Heritage Foundation, Heritage Lectures No. 657, Washington, March 20, 2000.

⁴⁴ *U.S. – EU Summit Highlights*, December 17, 1999.

⁴⁵ J.C. Hulsmann, *A Grand Bargain with Europe: Preserving NATO for the 21st Century*, The Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum No. 643, Washington, January 24, 2000.

⁴⁶ Austrian Diplomatic Academy, *The Euro-Atlantic relationship for 21st Century: Destinies linked to security, democracy, and prosperity* by U.S. Ambassador to Austria Kathryn Walt Hall, January 27, 2000.

⁴⁷ D.E. Staszczak, *USA-UE. Wzajemne stosunki na tle zmian globalnych*, Toruń 1998, p. 44.

⁴⁸ D. Eden, *Europe and the Atlantic relationship*, London 2000, pp. 2, 8, 9.

⁴⁹ *Rocznik Strategiczny*, 1999/2000, p. 252.

⁵⁰ *Remarks by Richard Morningstar* U.S. Ambassador to the European Union, L'Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, Paris, April 20, 2000.

⁵¹ *Statement by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright*, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Florence, Italy, May 24, 2000.

⁵² *Sprawy Międzynarodowe*, No. 2, 1999, pp. 87, 92, 93.

⁵³ *Remarks by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright*, Aspen European Dialogue, Venice, Italy, March 18, 2000.

⁵⁴ J. Czaputowicz, *System czy nieład? Bezpieczeństwo europejskie u progu XXI wieku*, Warszawa 1998, p. 186.

⁵⁵ *Resolution in the Senat of the United States - S.RES.175*, August 5, 1999.

⁵⁶ *Basler Zeitung* 2, May of 1998.

⁵⁷ J. Czaputowicz, *System czy nieład? Bezpieczeństwo europejskie u progu XXI wieku*, Warszawa 1998, p. 188.

⁵⁸ *Washington Post*, 28 April 1998.

⁵⁹ *Neue Zurchen Zeitung*, 2 May 1998.

⁶⁰ *The Wall Street Journal*, 23 March 1998. See: Krzymowski, A., Impact of the initiatives the European Union countries on the internal transformation of NATO in the years 1997 - 2000, *National Defence University Scientific Quarterly*, No. 3, 2005, pp. 38-46.

⁶¹ Eurostat, *Statistics in Focus: EU External Trade in 2000*, No3/2001.

⁶² J. Czaputowicz, *System czy nieład? Bezpieczeństwo europejskie u progu XXI wieku*, Warszawa 1998, p. 168.

⁶³ *New York Times*, 28 April 1998.

⁶⁴ *New York Times*, 30 March 1998. See: Krzymowski, A., Internal transformation of NATO in the late twentieth century, *Athenaeum. Polish Political Science Studies*, No. 18/2007, pp. 126-146.

Chapter 4

11 SEPTEMBER 2001 – TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

September 11, 2001, will forever be synonymous with the largest terrorist attack that the world has witnessed to date. Two Boeing 767 passenger aircraft, owned by United Airlines, hit the twin World Trade Centre (WTC) buildings in Manhattan, New York, USA, 18 minutes apart. Simultaneously, a third Boeing 767, hit one of the wings of the Pentagon building in Washington, the HQs of the U.S. Armed Forces. A fourth aircraft, the Boeing 757, which was most likely heading toward the property of the U.S. President at Camp David, or the White House fell near Pittsburgh, in the northern United States of America. A trap car exploded in front of the Washington State Department building at the same time. These events have significantly influenced transatlantic relations in the field of security. It had implications in the legal and international sphere and influenced the cooperation between the United States of America and the European Union as well as the European strategic autonomy.

1. Legal issues

The concept of ‘terrorism’ comes from the Latin words ‘terrere’ - to frighten, ‘terror’ - fear, terror. This term is understood as a method of operation based on the use of various methods and forms of using violence against individual persons of the power apparatus (individual terrorism) or random members of society through attacks on offices, public premises, barracks (collective terrorism). According to the Encyclopaedia of International Affairs and the UN, terrorism is the use of

maltreatment to achieve political or economic goals in international relations; a form of intervention by violence by special military or police units or by terrorist organisations.¹ However, yet another definition, which supplements the content of the term, says that terrorism is a deliberate use of violence or threat to create fear; knowingly extorting or intimidating governments or societies for political, religious, or ideological pressure.²

Terrorism has gone beyond the borders of individual countries. It brings clear international consequences, as well as affects inter-state relations. In 1976, a CIA report indicated links between 140 groups from 50 countries. International terrorism can be defined as acts of violence going beyond accepted customary and legal norms. In other words, terrorism is violence used against persons protected by international law (diplomats, leaders of states, governments) and protected places (embassies), civil aviation, mass communication (metro, trains). It is characterised by reaching for all methods and means - murders, kidnappings, explosive, and poisonous substances, and aiming to cause universal fear and a state of emergency. Contemporary international terrorism is not, however, a homogeneous phenomenon. It can talk about its various definitions and mention many typologies. However, it should be acknowledged that the events of September 11, 2001, were strictly speaking terrorist acts.

Legal methods of combating international terrorism are regulated, among others, by the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation, the 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, the 1971 Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation, the 1973 Convention on the

Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, the 1976 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. The key to these conventions is the provisions enabling the extradition of perpetrators of specific acts prohibited by the above conventions.

In connection with the September 11 attacks, there was also the problem of using terms such as ‘assault’, ‘war’, and ‘warfare’ in international law. Determining assault (aggression) was important to determine the content of the right to self-defence. In the post-war years, the definition of assault was discussed for many years in the UN Special Committee. As a result of the work of the Special Committee, the General Assembly on December 14, 1974, adopted a resolution defining assault. The assault is ‘the use of armed force by the state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the other state, or otherwise incompatible with the UN Charter’.³

First and foremost, under UN Resolution 3314, the assault was related to a state acting as an aggressor and the use of its armed forces or armed groups acting on its behalf. However, it was considered that if September 11 were with the Taliban government's inspiration and participation, it could be recognised as an assault in the light of art. 3-point g: ‘sending by some state on behalf of that state armed bands, groups, irregular troops or mercenaries that carry out armed actions against another state of such weight that they are equivalent to regular acts, e.g. bombing or serious involvement in this area. ‘Besides, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter states: ‘nothing in this Charter shall prejudice the inherent right of every member of the United Nations against whom an armed attack has taken place, whether to an individual or collective self-defence, before the Security Council takes the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security’. Also, on September 12, 2001, the Security

Council adopted Resolution No. 1368, in which it strongly condemned the terrorist acts of September 11 and confirmed the inherent right of each member of the United Nations to an individual or collective self-defence.⁴ On September 28, 2001, the Security Council confirmed in Resolution 1373 that each state must refrain from organising, provoking, assisting, or participating in acts of terrorism directed against another state. The resolution set up a Security Council Committee to monitor the application of the resolution.⁵

It should be emphasised that the interpretation of the September 11 acts of assault was an attempt to expand this concept. However, the list of assault acts is not definitively closed. Therefore, the UN Security Council may have decided to extend it to other acts that will constitute assault under the letter of the United Nations Charter. The science of international law traditionally defines ‘war’ as a state of armed struggle (armed struggle and undertaking other hostile acts) between states and as an opposition to the state of peace.⁶ The term ‘war’ (armed struggle) is associated with the concept of ‘war’. In this case, international law also explicitly states that it is warfare when the two countries’ intentions pursue specific political (economic and social) goals through organised force use (military violence). Primarily armed forces, conduct fighting, battles, and operations on land, in the air, and at sea.⁷ On the other hand, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation member states, citing Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, were convinced that in the sense of *opinio necessitatis* is a war. It is an extension of the meaning of the concept of ‘war’. This is certainly an extension of the meaning of the concept of ‘war’. Therefore, the definition was extended to include war and hostile relations between states and an individual, group of people, or organisation.

The events that took place in the United States of America on September 11, 2001, and the reaction to them influenced the formation of new norms of international law preceded by international custom. This was undoubtedly related to the way of perceiving - in the longer-term – U.S. interests. The United States of America as a strong and influential actor influences the formation of new customs that contribute to the new norms of international law. The U.S. was convinced that following its path in pursuing its interests, it did not need to pay special attention to international customs or norms. They were also aware that relying on customs or legal norms means that the actions taken do not arouse much controversy.

2. Reactions and cooperation

The United States of America cannot impose its will by conventional military means. The United States of America's hegemonic role in the global system is being eroded by the disappearance of bipolarity and a new rival hegemonic role on a world scale. The events of September 11 have certainly directly influenced U.S. foreign and security policy and relations with Europeans. In this situation, the Americans faced an alternative: either they would give up playing the role of a 'world military policeman', that is, they would opt for isolationism to be able to focus their attention on internal security or would strive to strengthen their role in the world. The U.S. administration's response to those events was certainly not isolationism. By building the global coalition against terrorism, the United States of America created a new kind of unilateralism. Under the slogan of the fight against terrorism, it was easier for the United States of America to take unilateral actions in multilateral enterprises. The CIA and other intelligence services had a special role to play

in this regard.⁸ President George W. Bush emphasised that the war on terror requires American cooperation with allies.⁹ It is worth noting that the Capitol had a favourable atmosphere because the Americans wanted to win. The U.S. wanted to win the first war of the 21st century. Therefore, they were building a strong coalition against terrorism.

Construction of a coalition

Professor David Calleo, director of European Studies at the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University, emphasised that the United States of America is and will remain a superpower. However, regional coalitions supervised by them are necessary.¹⁰ Americans needed allies to get legitimacy. The war waged by the U.S. is a demonstration of their military strength and expansion of American interests. Threats, especially, the most difficult to identify, are to unite the international community, in this case under the wings of the United States of America. NATO's immediate support strengthened instinctive European solidarity with the U.S. The North Atlantic Council met on the night of September 11, 2001, to express its solidarity with the United States of America.¹¹ The allies united in their determination to combat terrorism. As a result, the United States of America could count on the help and support of 18 allies in North America and Europe. This proved that NATO solidarity remains the essence of the Alliance. The day following the attacks, the North Atlantic Council recognised that the attack against the U.S. was made directly from abroad and should be treated as an act covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.¹² Under this article, all Alliance countries considered this attack an attack on themselves.

The reaction to the terrorist attack on the WTC showed that the Euro-Atlantic community was much wider than 19 NATO

members. The 46 members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) - from North America, through Europe and Central Asia - issued a statement in which they agreed that the terrorist activities were not only an attack on the U.S. but their shared values. In a statement, 46 states committed to taking all measures necessary to combat the 'scourge' of terrorism.¹³ In particular, the EAPC will be a valuable forum for finding the right instruments for a counter-terrorism campaign. In this context, the EAPC Action Plan for 2002-2004 was very important.¹⁴ Asymmetric conflicts required not only new strategies but also innovative policy assessments and legal implications.

On September 12, 2001, an extraordinary meeting of the European Commission took place. It debated various political aspects for which the Commission was particularly responsible. In particular, Romano Prodi emphasised that cooperation between European Union member states and the U.S. in the fight against terrorism is more than ever necessary and must develop with doubled energy.¹⁵ A few days later, the heads of state and government of the European Union stated that the U.S. administration and the Americans can count on total solidarity and full cooperation of EU member states.¹⁶ The U.S. Congress on September 18, 2001, adopted a resolution in which it stated that the September 11 acts were treacherous violence against the United States of America and its citizens. They legitimised the use of American military forces¹⁷. Moreover, the EU Member States immediately expressed their solidarity with the Americans in the fight against terrorism and supported the adoption of measures, including support for military action, consistent with the United Nations Charter and UN Security Council Resolution 1368.¹⁸ Representatives of the European Union member states and the United States of America issued a joint statement on

September 20, 2001, in which they declared that shortly, the U.S. and the European Union would cooperate in a broad anti-terrorist coalition. They emphasised that they would work together to expand and improve global cooperation.¹⁹ The EU Presidency, European Commission, High Representative Javier Solana, and the Member States worked to establish a strong partnership with the U.S. The European Union and the United States of America had to take leadership in the fight against terrorism. Both sides opted for a strong transatlantic anti-terrorist coalition. Therefore, EU/U.S. leadership was to be based on permanent, timely, and comprehensive consultations at all levels.²⁰ The European Union, with the United Nations and the United States of America, had all the means at its disposal to strengthen cooperation in the fight against terrorism.²¹

During the informal meeting of NATO ministers on September 26, the United States of America made sure they could rely on 18 of their NATO allies. It was not a meeting where formal decisions were made. However, ministers clearly expressed their views on how to combat terrorism. They said that above all, it is necessary to combine effective efforts and cooperation of interviews.²² Under Resolution 1373 adopted on September 28, 2001, the UN Security Council confirmed the legitimacy of U.S. military operations²³ and outlined the responsibilities of all countries in the joint fight against terrorism. Of course, all countries were to contribute according to their capabilities.²⁴ NATO allies on October 4, 2001, agreed to take individual and collective measures. They determined:

- intensifying work on the division of intelligence tasks,
- providing - individually or collectively, by their capabilities - assistance to NATO member countries and other countries that are or may be the addressees of terrorist threats, because they supported the campaign against terrorism,

- taking the necessary measures to ensure the security of the United States of America and other allies in its territory,
- guaranteeing access of the United States of America and other allies to the territories of NATO countries in the event of operations against terrorism.

The North Atlantic Council also emphasised that:

- The Alliance is ready to deploy part of its naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean as confirmation of NATO's presence and demonstration of strength,
- The Alliance is ready to deploy part of NATO's early warning system to support anti-terrorism activities.²⁵

Secretary of State Colin Powell emphasised that this demonstrates the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's capabilities, the increase in its significance, and the huge role it must play. More and more countries - in his opinion - wanted to become part of this great Alliance, which indicated new missions for the future.²⁶

On October 7, 2001, the United States of America and the United Kingdom began military operations as part of a global campaign against terrorism. France offered the involvement of its AWACS aircraft in Bosnia to thereby relieve the U.S. resources engaged in the area. Other NATO allies committed to direct military support as the military operation developed. The Alliance itself would continue to support the coalition militarily and in other spheres.²⁷ The day after the start of the military action, the European Union declared its full solidarity with the U.S. and sincere support for these actions. It emphasised that they were taken in self-defence and accordance with the UN Charter and Security Council Resolution 1368. Furthermore, the European Union was to consult closely with the USA. Military action was part of a broader multilateral strategy.²⁸ Declarations of similar content were made by the Supreme Allied Commander

Europe (SACEUR).²⁹ Just a few months earlier, experts emphasised that relations between Europe and North America were at a crossroads. The reaction to the tragic events initially demonstrated that Europe and North America will remain for at least the next few decades a community of states that share the same values. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation plays a major role in this community. The U.S. asked North Atlantic Treaty Organisation allies for intelligence support, access to ports, and airspace. The United States of America's request was met in one day.³⁰ At a press conference on November 26, 2001, after a meeting of the Political Committee, Klaus Bühler, chairman of the WEU Assembly and a member of the German parliament, said that after September 11, most European countries gave their support to the U.S.-based on individual decisions. However, it would also be necessary to use European institutions on behalf of all of Europe for this purpose. The European response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks did not live up to expectations. It did not show actual solidarity with the United States of America. It was based on state-state assistance.³¹

The United States of America and Europe must achieve a higher level of political, economic, and military cooperation and coordinate their political activities so that countries outside this area cannot exploit the differences between the U.S. and Europe. Before September 11, Europe and the United States of America differed in many things: from genetically modified food to missile defence. The events of September 11 changed this fundamentally for some time. After the terrorist attack on the title page of 'Le Monde', was: 'We are all Americans'. In this sense, Osama bin Laden has restored a common identity to the West.³² States have been forced to state which side they are on. However, it cannot be denied that coalitions are, to some extent, also the result of cold calculations, in which the parties are not always

about the same thing. Still, more important was the fact that a common response to attacks and threats was found. It should be noted how clear the political response was: all of Europe stood on the side of the U.S. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation worked then, unanimously recognising the attack as a violation of the ally's sovereignty and activating Art. 5 of Washington Treaty.³³

Neither the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation nor the European Union is the institution that could fully meet all challenges. The problems of 'soft' security, which have a specific impact on stability, can be best solved by the European Union and its members with the help of the U.S. and occasionally NATO. In turn, the problems of 'hard' security will remain in the hands of the U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, with sporadic assistance from the European Union and its members. This is not a recipe for an artificial division of labour. Both institutions – European Union and NATO - agree on ways of solving problems separately, but the problems cannot be separated. Neglecting the problems of 'soft' security will increase the problems of 'hard' security. On the other hand, neglecting the problems of 'hard' security will certainly negatively affect the problems of 'soft' security.

The United States of America does not want to become a European force, but it wants to be still connected with Europe, to be a force in Europe. Aspects of European Union enlargement had to go hand in hand with the structure of U.S.-EU relations and, of course, the European Union and NATO. The events of September 11 sketched the final test for European and transatlantic relations.³⁴ In this context, President George W. Bush has conducted numerous talks with leading European politicians. On September 27, 2001, he met in Belgium with the Prime Minister of Belgium and then President of the European

Council Guy Verhofstadt,³⁵ October 9 with Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder,³⁶ November 1 with Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schuessel.³⁷ All these and subsequent talks allowed obtaining full agreement as to further U.S. actions and internal coherence of the anti-terrorist alliance.³⁸

It seemed that the entire coalition would be cantered around NATO, which would be at the centre of planning, and every ally would contribute to it. The Alliance's recall of Article 5 was very important. It allowed the U.S. access to airspace, ports, and bases. This, in turn, was a key element for military operations. Like never, Americans have managed to form a global diplomatic coalition in the fight against terrorism. Cooperation between Europe and the U.S. after September 11 was primarily based on regular meetings of heads of state and key ministers. The Americans have also managed to convince their partners and allies to some extent that the attack on the U.S. was an attack on the world. Emphasising that the main organisation that should face these challenges is NATO. Events at the time show the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation for mutual security in the 21st century. Over several decades of cooperation - in planning, training, and military operations - foundations were created that could be used in the war on terror. There is no doubt that the United States of America will maintain its commitment to NATO and Europe. The events of September 11 strengthened and unified, to some extent, the United States of America and Europe.

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, speaking at the OSCE conference on December 4, 2001, in Bucharest, expressed his satisfaction with the Organisation's adoption of the anti-terrorist action plan. He emphasised that this is not a U.S. war on terror but a war of the international community against terrorism. Americans treat the OSCE membership as a strengthening of the

bilateral relations with European countries and Eurasia. Moreover, as a complement to NATO membership and relations with the European Union. The OSCE Comprehensive Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism, prepared under the leadership of Danish Ambassador Biering and Romanian Ambassador Bota, outlined concrete steps that each Member State could take in a further global campaign.³⁹ At meetings on December 6, 2001, EU foreign ministers considered ways to strengthen institutional forms of cooperation important to Euro-Atlantic security.⁴⁰

After the attacks on September 11, the world changed. On December 6, 2001, for the first time since these events, NATO foreign ministers met to discuss the adaptation of the Alliance to new challenges. Of course, terrorism was at the centre of this discussion. In this situation, however, it was not enough to create new structures. A more constructive collaboration was needed to take advantage of this unique opportunity to build a new quality of cooperation.⁴¹ The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was to support the United States of America until its goals were met. The process of adaptation and strengthening of the Alliance's military capabilities was to proceed. Besides, NATO member states were to deepen their relations with other countries and international organisations to improve the exchange of information, which may affect the effectiveness of joint action. In this context, NATO and the European Union began an intense discussion on ways to strengthen cooperation in the fight against terrorism. The meeting of foreign ministers of the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Union on December 6 stressed the importance of relations between these organisations.⁴² The ministers have pledged to work to fully utilise their resources as part of close cooperation. They also declared that they would continue their efforts to combat terrorism, both at the organisation and state levels.⁴³ It

was not just a symbolic meeting. NATO and the European Union have worked closely together in the Balkans and the fight against terrorism.⁴⁴ In a situation where the North Atlantic Alliance has opted for non-engagement, the EU military crisis management capabilities are beneficial to the Alliance and transatlantic relations.⁴⁵ The United States of America supported the European defence project. However, NATO had to remain the focus of efforts to ensure and strengthen collective defence and security in the transatlantic area. In effect, the American vision of the European Security and Defence Identity was strengthened, which was important in terms of joint capabilities for maintaining peace in Europe and the process of building European strategic autonomy.

Certainly, global challenges will exert a long-term influence on international security and its system. Therefore, it seemed that the real problems at that time were the size and depth and the specificity of the challenges that the stable, relying on pillars had to face. In addition, Belgium's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Louis Michel, then stressed that everyone was aware of the new impetus needed to bring closer together nations that recognise the same values. However, it was important to find a new consensus, a new coalition between people who share these values.⁴⁶ The events of September 11 contributed to the historic meeting of two organisations, which then began to cooperate more effectively with each other.⁴⁷ At the time, Europe and North America needed NATO more than ever before. The North Atlantic Alliance has become an integral part of the anti-terrorist coalition, but not the only one. The armed forces of NATO allies from London and Paris to Berlin, Rome, and Ankara have contributed to the common cause. In Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation also had to retain its influence on other major challenges emerging on the road to continent unity. In the fight

against terrorist groups, it is difficult to imagine the future without NATO as the core of European and American efforts to defend a common civilisation.⁴⁸

September 11 changed the way we view the world and place the United States of America in it. In this increasingly dangerous world, the U.S. needed friends and allies more than ever before. In the face of new threats to global terrorism, the foreign ministers of NATO member states agreed that the Alliance's capabilities should be strengthened. They also expressed their solidarity with the United States of America through a unique community of support for U.S. military operations.⁴⁹ The tradition of transatlantic cooperation has been strengthened in a sense. It was to prevent him from returning to old practices. Cooperation between the United States of America and Europe has become more effective after September 11. As new customs have emerged in cooperation - with new impetus, regular meetings of heads of state and key ministers have been launched, accompanied by literally thousands of officials at every level. The military campaign was only the beginning of more comprehensive solutions.⁵⁰

The events of September 11 suddenly changed the global strategy of the transatlantic partners. By engaging completely in the fight against terrorism, Americans have increasingly clearly demanded that Europeans take over the task of stabilizing the situation in Kosovo or Macedonia. It was to allow the U.S. to focus effectively on achieving its global goals. However, it is important to remember that cooperation does not necessarily mean integration. Combating terrorism entailed strengthening the mechanisms of nation-states. The threat of a terrorist attack also - certainly - increases the sense of attachment of citizens to their countries and makes more emphasis on their national interests. Terrorist attacks on the United States of America have changed

American societies and changed the priorities of U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. is such an important factor in international relations that these changes had a wider impact. However, there remains the fundamental question of U.S. relations with the international community. The proclamation of the United States of America's universal war on terror was a political metaphor. This is an example of the U.S.'s unilateral involvement in a world arranged on its terms.⁵¹

Cooperation of justice and civil defence

The United States of America and the European Union have identified several main areas in the context of future cooperation to eliminate international terrorism. In a ministerial statement issued on September 20, 2001, both sides stated that they would intensify security cooperation in areas such as aviation and other transport modes, police and judicial activities, financial sanctions, export control, border control, and electronic data exchange. This statement was issued on the day of the meeting between Secretary of State Colin Powell, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Louis Michel, European Commissioner for External Affairs Chris Patten, and Javier Solana – Secretary-General of the Council of the EU and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The U.S. and the European Union were to make comprehensive, systematic efforts to eliminate international terrorism - its leaders, activities, and structures. Besides, the United States of America and the European Union have declared that they will work together to deepen cooperation and broader implementation of international instruments. They agreed to cooperate vigorously in the following areas:

- aviation and other transport safety,
- police and judicial cooperation, including extradition,

- combating terrorist financing, including financial sanctions,
- export control and non-proliferation,
- border control, including visas and adequate security of documents,
- strengthening the right of access to information and electronic data exchange.⁵²

After the extraordinary meetings of the Transport Council, and the Justice and Home Affairs Council, an imperative summit of EU heads of state and government on September 21, 2001, was held in Brussels. The goal was to analyse the international situation and to give an impetus to the European Union's actions. The European Council, therefore, addressed the Union's strategy to combat global terrorism. In conclusion to the first part, entitled 'Solidarity and cooperation with the United States of America', as well as expressing sympathy and solidarity with America, the Council declared the will of the European Union to cooperate with the United States of America in prosecution and punishment of perpetrators, their principals, and accomplices of terrorist acts in the U.S. The Council stated that any U.S. response would have a legal basis, based on UN Security Council Resolution 1368. Also, European Union member states have indicated their willingness to contribute to retaliation, as appropriate.⁵³

In the context of judicial and civil defence cooperation, the European Council on 18 October 2001 examined specific cooperation proposals that were presented by U.S. authorities at the meeting of 27 September 2001 between the head of the European Commission and the President of the United States of America. The technical examination of these proposals was the subject of discussions between U.S. authorities and the 'troika'. Most of these proposals were then included in the EU Action Plan. Moreover, the Union has prepared itself to participate with the United States of America in such initiatives as:

- facilitating mutual judicial assistance between the competent authorities of the United States of America and the Member States of the European Union on extradition related to terrorism, by the constitutional principles of states,
- strengthening joint efforts regarding the non-proliferation and export control of both chemical, bacteriological weapons and nuclear substances that can be used for terrorist purposes,
- intensifying cooperation to guarantee adequate security for passports and visas and to eliminate false documents.⁵⁴

In October 2001, the European Council again clearly stated its support for counter-terrorism activities in all aspects within the UN-defined structure, meanwhile confirming total solidarity with the United States of America. The European Council continued its efforts to strengthen the coalition against terrorism in all its forms. The European Council also examined the threats of the use of biological and chemical agents in terrorist activities. These threats entailed the need for action on the part of each Member State and the European Union as a whole. The authorities were to be vigilant in this regard and announced the intensification of cooperation between intelligence services, police, civil defence, and health services. The European Union was also to strengthen its activities in other regions of the world aimed at promoting an international system based on security, prosperity, democracy, and development.⁵⁵ U.S. Secretary of Justice John Ashcroft visited several European countries to discuss joint efforts in the campaign against international terrorism. The German Interior Minister, Otto Schily said that the United States is grateful for the 'valuable and fruitful' access to information, the ability to conduct investigations in Germany, and activities in stopping the financing of the terrorist network.⁵⁶

Another response to terrorist attacks on New York and Washington was the meeting of EU Justice and Home Affairs ministers during a special session on the review of needs in the fight against terrorism and planning to strengthen the police and judicial cooperation with the United States of America against terrorist threats. These areas of cooperation covered not only cases where the USA had initial links with the Union, such as relations with Europol, but also new spheres that allowed joining efforts. The strategic cooperation agreement between the U.S. and Europol signed on December 6, 2001, was the first formal agreement with the new Union police office. It was also a step towards facilitating far-reaching, comprehensive cooperation. However, the United States of America-Europol agreement did not concern the exchange of personal data. That is why the U.S. and European Union authorities started a discussion on a complementary agreement that would provide for the principles of personal data protection, recognising the differences between U.S. and European law on procedures.⁵⁷ As part of the European Commission's offer to provide possible practical assistance to the United States of America, the launch of warning system by Environment Commissioner Margot Wallström. The system was based on teams:

- search and rescue,
- medical assistance,
- psychological help.

Expert teams were mobilised and remained on alert in several Member States. Civil defence assistance offered to the United States of America included experts:

- Belgian (assistance to burned victims, identification of victims, 10 people),
- French (search and rescue teams, 250 people and the possibility of a further 250 people),

- Swedish (search and rescue teams, 80 people),
- Irish (search and rescue aid, 12 people),
- Spanish (search and rescue help),
- Danish (help with identification),
- Italian (100 people),
- Finnish.

Commissioner Wallström said the European Union disaster expert group had been mobilised and was ready to assist the United States and victims. This structure operated 24 hours a day and aimed at providing emergency assistance.⁵⁸

3. The process of building Europe's strategic autonomy

Consequences for ESDI

According to Secretary of State Colin Powell, NATO reacted decisively to the dramatic events of September 11. Such actions clearly showed how indispensable the North Atlantic Alliance is with its collective defence.⁵⁹ On the same day of tragic events, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty was invoked for the first time. It showed with full force NATO's approach to security, assuming the possibility of including collective action as a response to an external terrorist attack on an ally. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation had to adapt its capabilities to these challenges. NATO defence ministers emphasised that they want to strengthen the Alliance, both in terms of concept and practice. Actions aimed at this were to include:

- further, focus on how the Alliance can participate in the fight against terrorism,
- preparation by the military authorities of NATO under the leadership of the North Atlantic Council of a military concept of defence against terrorism,

- review of the Alliance's defence effectiveness and military policy, structures, and capabilities for its missions to reach full coverage against terrorist threats,
- further efforts on the Alliance's ability to deal with the possibility of terrorists using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials,
- consistent efforts of states and relevant NATO structures to identify possible measures in all relevant DCI areas, both short- and long-term, or additional efforts to strengthen the Alliance's defence base against terrorist attacks,
- intensifying the exchange of information between allies warning against threats, intelligence assessments,⁶⁰ concepts, equipment, exercises of military forces designated to combat threats of terrorism, and other measures that can improve the defence of the Alliance against such threats. Actions to increase NATO's ability to counter terrorism were to be coherent and immediate, to be part of more general work on improving the Alliance's military capabilities.⁶¹

Americans emphasised that the resources of the North Atlantic Alliance and the command structure could not be made available to other institutions. The developing European Security and Defence Identity within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was a priority for the United States of America. On the other hand, the issue of the efficient functioning of CESDP in conditions when it still lacked significant capabilities or had to rely on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation remained a problem. There were, however, many outstanding issues about the future of the Common European Security and Defence Policy. These and other problems were certainly a test for the coherence of transatlantic relations and an attempt for the effective construction of European strategic autonomy. The events of September 11 show the great importance of the policy

of partnership and cooperation of the North Atlantic Alliance. Therefore, this process should be deepened and broadened, the European defence identity should be developed within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.⁶²

The events of September 11 have inevitably led to a new discussion on the global role of the U.S. Isolationists have tried to use these events to convince them of the need to limit the United States of America's global commitment. It tried to convince that such attacks are the result of such involvement. However, Europeans could certainly expect a firm U.S. stance on transatlantic responsibility.⁶³ In transatlantic relations after the September 11 attacks, they showed full political solidarity with their American ally. Europe was heavily involved in the Balkans and, if necessary, declared its readiness to expand its presence. At the same time, NATO expected Europe's strong will to build crisis management capabilities.

NATO member states were determined to meet the challenges of that time and shape a common future, and the centre of international efforts was the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.⁶⁴ Therefore, Euro-Atlantic solidarity was necessary, but it was not enough. For Europeans, a firm U.S. stance on accountability confirmed ESDI's logic and European strategic autonomy. The United States of America needed highly trained and effective forces as part of peacekeeping missions or to support those missions when the Alliance is not involved in each operation. An example of this cooperation was the Alliance's assistance in the sphere of intelligence.⁶⁵ Moreover, U.S. resources in the Balkans have been replaced by European forces. Significant and symbolic was also the launch by NATO of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) from a base in Europe and the replacement of an American one that had moved to Asia. The Americans also wanted NATO to be a very

effective global permanent coalition. A coalition that should become the centre of the international community's joint response to terrorism, both then and in the future.

This situation necessitated the revision of many plans and views. The European Union's security program is heavily linked to NATO, and must, therefore, develop both North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Union defence capabilities. The many EU Member States, such as Sweden, could not afford to build two systems: one for NATO and the other for the European Union. Therefore, the European Union had to take the solutions already adopted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. One can, therefore, risk saying that there will be a platform on which the European Union will join NATO, and these will be two fully interoperable organisations.

Since the attacks on the United States of America originated directly outside NATO, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty was launched for the first time in history. Some observers believed that the decision was taken too quickly and without consulting legal experts. If such actions as those of September 11 were interpreted as an 'armed attack' in the sense of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, then NATO's role was to change radically. When the Alliance changed its Strategic Concept at the 1999 Summit, the USA wanted to expand the scope of Article 5, including the fight against terrorism, sabotage, and organised crime. At the same time, European allies were not ready to accept this proposal. But as a compromise article 24 of the New NATO Strategic Concept was adopted, which indicates that the security interests of the Alliance may be affected by threats of a broader nature, including terrorist activities, sabotage, and organised crime. Now, any act like that of September 11 may lead to reference to Article 5. A very broad interpretation of the 'armed attack' does not make a distinction between direct actions

of individuals, groups, and organisations, or states. According to some commentators, Article 24 of the Strategic Concept has been thus incorporated into Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. NATO's decisions, however, brought many further questions. In this case, the allies agreed to USA demands for specific actions already taken, including:

- strengthening tasks between allied intelligence services,
- providing access for the U.S. and other allies to ports and airspace,
- deploying part of the Standing Naval Forces on the East coast of the Mediterranean,
- deployment of airborne early warning forces to support anti-terrorism operations.

Thus, many questions arose. What will the consequences of this decision be for the Alliance, and the future security of European allies? Will Article 5 of the Washington Treaty have the same meaning and value in the future for similar actions in Europe (for example against U.S. resources in member countries)? Will Article 5 only deal with purely political involvement without real military implications?⁶⁶ At the NAC - PSC meetings on September 24 and October 23, 2001, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Union exchanged information on the measures taken by both organisations in the context of the fight against terrorism. Many proposals have been made to strengthen cooperation between the two organisations.⁶⁷ The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation - certainly - plays a key role in the fight against terrorism. The NATO plan is focused on continuing the military adaptation of the Alliance. These activities were to consist of:

- review of defence plans, in which members agree to increase the proportion of forces that can be deployed and maintained during operations outside the Alliance,

- renewing commitment to fulfilling the Alliance's Force Goals in such a way that NATO has the necessary means to meet new challenges,
- support for NATO foreign ministers' agreements on creating new mechanisms to cooperate with Russia,
- mission overview in the Balkans,
- continuing consultations on missile defence,
- reviewing the status of European Security and Defence Identity,
- reviewing the progress made in the DCI case and agreeing on the need to place greater emphasis on achieving goals, especially in the case of key capabilities, which was to be considered at the Prague Summit in November 2002.

At the meeting on December 18, 2001, in Brussels, the ministers of the North Atlantic Alliance emphasised the need to modernise NATO. Although the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is the most successful alliance in history, they underlined that these decisions and discussions will help strengthen NATO as an organisation playing a key role in ensuring the security of citizens and protecting the values shared by the societies of allied countries. The main strategic goal of the North Atlantic Alliance has always been to have capabilities enabling it to go beyond the strict area of the Alliance. Defence ministers gathered on December 18, 2001, in Brussels were aware that they had to fulfil these promises. Therefore, they agreed to send and maintain funds and soldiers outside their bases.⁶⁸

Joint efforts in the Balkans have facilitated peace and stability in the region and have shown that close cooperation brings immeasurable benefits. The events of September 11 highlighted the importance of strengthening cooperation between the two organisations regarding common security, defence, and crisis management interests. NATO member states were

determined to make progress in all aspects of relations and noted the need to seek solutions that would satisfy all allies in terms of the participation of European allies not belonging to the European Union. The events after September 11 show that the security problem is changing in different, sometimes unpredictable ways. Through DCI, the United States of America wanted to strengthen Alliance forces to have better capabilities to meet new challenges. Strengthening European capabilities was crucial in this process.⁶⁹ In this context, during a debate at the WEU Assembly, Tony Llyod from the United Kingdom stressed that building a political will to fight terrorism is a challenge for all Europeans.⁷⁰

Since the September 11 attacks, the task of building European defence capabilities has become increasingly urgent and increasingly complex. This was again revealed by the war in Afghanistan. There were still limited opportunities for military operations in Europe. New terrorist threats seem to suggest to the EU that the new security and defence policy should take account of changing needs. The United States of America engaged NATO to declare war against the Taliban while maintaining all command and leadership structures. It indicates that Europe was lacking in significant capabilities, such as intelligence, logistics, communication, and air transport, as it built European strategic autonomy. The events of September 11 also show why Europeans should be ready to contribute to the peacekeeping and crisis management process. In contrast, Thérèse Delpech, the strategic director of the French Atomic Energy Commission, emphasised that the European Union is prepared to fight terrorism (peace-making, peacekeeping). The United States of America, on the other hand, called for new solutions to strengthen its power in the world.⁷¹

As WEU President of the Assembly Klaus Bühler said: ‘there is no sign of an increase in defence budgets, which is necessary’. British officials claimed that European forces were needed more than ever before. They would see them as complementing NATO by making a greater contribution to managing small-scale crises in regions such as Africa. According to the United Kingdom, these forces were to be the European army of the North Atlantic Alliance. France, in turn, did not want forces closely integrated with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, while Germany and Sweden wanted to focus on peacekeeping missions. There was also disagreement about the rapid response forces, especially as to how they were financed. Without solving these problems there was little hope of success. There was also a question about political will, said General Mertil Melin, a Swedish military representative on the EU committee who oversaw security and defence policy.⁷² Bruno Tertrais from the Department of Strategic Affairs of the Ministry of Defence of France opposed the broad interpretation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. In his view, this interpretation set a precedent for the implementation of global NATO, which France strongly opposed.

Consequences for CESDP

In Recommendation No. 694, the WEU Assembly emphasised that terrorist acts, such as in the USA, fall primarily in the category of international crime.⁷³ The use of military means against terrorism and its supporters can never lead to criminal acts. This automatically gave rise to difficulties in determining the difference between events in the U.S. and the conflict in Chechnya, the Middle East, Northern Ireland, or actions initiated by ETA (*Euskadi Ta Askatasuna*)⁷⁴ in Spain or Kurdistan Workers’ Parties (PKK) in Turkey. The events of

September 11, 2001, and the use of biological and chemical substances that primarily threaten the lives of civilians not only blurred the dividing line between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ security. But also showed that the traditional instruments for countering threats since the end of World War II are already very outdated. What was the contribution of Europe and its role in this regard, and what could the European Union do?

The European Union has largely focused its efforts to combat terrorism primarily on political dialogue and the implementation of the entire package of operations and activities in the field of justice and home affairs, economy, and finance. Traditionally the neutral EU Member States, such as Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden, objected to the stronger declaration of support proposed by the Belgian Presidency for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. They could not imagine taking specific measures in CESDP to combat terrorism. Javier Solana, WEU Secretary-General and High Representative for CFSP said that the fight against terrorism is not a military conflict. Referring to the creation of a European rapid response force, he stated that the purpose of their creation has not changed. These forces will be intended for peacekeeping and peace-making operations. Terrorism, on the other hand, should be combated primarily using police techniques and resources. Other views have also emerged in this regard. French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin emphasised on September 24, 2001, that the attacks of September 11 united Europeans. At an informal meeting of European Union defence ministers on October 12, 2001, some countries argued that the scope of CESDP’s military tasks at that time was too limited. The European Union was still active based on the program before September 11. To support the USA in the fight against terrorism, CESDP had to change direction.

In Recommendation No. 694, the WEU Assembly asked the Council what European Union requirements are for revising the CESDP and taking the necessary measures to counter international terrorism and to build relevant capabilities and resources. However, the European Union was at that time exposed to internal quarrels between the Member States, the European Commission, and the European Parliament due to the allocation of funds for the Common Foreign and Security Policy.⁷⁵ The EU Member States after September 11 began to emphasise that they should strengthen the construction of the CFSP, achieve strategic autonomy so that the Union can genuinely be able to speak with one voice and undertake genuinely joint actions.⁷⁶

Global terrorism affected CESDP primarily in the following ways:

- the events of September 11 broadened the scope of CFSP's responsibility,
- the fight against terrorism did not change the importance of Petersberg tasks, but the European Union was to be aware of the pressure on resources if some countries would want to build additional capabilities related to military and police actions against terrorist actions,
- the EU was to be ready to take more responsibility in peacekeeping missions, placing more emphasis on preparations for operational readiness,
- the European Union also had to review its capabilities and forces deployed for crisis management operations,
- the September 11 attacks have also shown the importance of further improving access to information for political decision-makers in the EU; and not only when it comes to threats from terrorism, but also for help in the early warning process. It has become a necessity to strengthen the capacity of the General

Secretariat and the EU Satellite Centre to capture confidential information, which would contribute to strengthening situational analyses and an early warning system.⁷⁷

At that time, at an informal meeting, fifteen European defence ministers agreed that they would improve cooperation between their military intelligence in the fight against terrorism. It also undertook to accelerate the implementation of the EU's security and defence policy, which was supposed to reach full efficiency in 2003. Javier Solana, European Union High Representative for CFSP, was asked to look for ways to improve cooperation between fifteen EU Member States in the field of military intelligence. The chairman of the meeting, André Flahaut, the Belgian defence minister, said he would like to extend this cooperation to civilian intelligence.⁷⁸

The Common European Security and Defence Policy is part of a broader project to build European strategic autonomy. Thanks to CESDP, Europe would take greater responsibility for European security and play a greater global role. At a meeting to discuss these problems, EU defence ministers confirmed that they were convinced that the events of 9/11 would make their project even more important. The European Union was to strengthen the capabilities and strength of crisis management, through their proper preparation and design. More important is that the events in New York and Washington made the international community aware that new threats may appear unexpectedly from unconventional actors, and that military action may sometimes be necessary to deal with security threats.⁷⁹ However, neither the Headline Goal nor the St. Petersburg missions met the needs of September 11.⁸⁰ CESDP crisis management was based on the experience of conflicts in the Balkans. This, however, had to be changed and management

adapted to new challenges and threats. which stood before Europe.⁸¹

Neither the European Union nor the North Atlantic Alliance had a military strategy to combat international terrorism even though the main security threat is referred to in the Strategic Concept, which the Alliance adopted in April 1999. The military campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was led by an international coalition of ‘willingness’ under U.S. leadership, but without NATO involvement, although the Atlantic Alliance referred to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The additional measures adopted by the European Council regarding the numerous important objectives of civilian aspects of crisis management raised the question of whether they would be a priority in the EU and would contribute to achieving appropriate crisis management capabilities. It was the main reason for transferring the relevant WEU functions to the European Union. First, the Treaty of Nice did not yet enter into force. Secondly, NATO was to provide the European Union with access to resources and capabilities for the European Union to conduct crisis management operations until there are satisfactory solutions to the CESDP problem regarding the participation of allied countries not belonging to the European Union.

As Nicole Gnesotto, director of the EU Institute for Security Studies emphasised that because of the complete deal with the fight against terrorism, Americans demanded that Europeans take over stabilising tasks in the Balkans. European governments then had to quickly assess how to fight international terrorism in the form it took.⁸² The events of September 11 indeed took place in North America, not Europe. However, as already underlined in the WEU Assembly Recommendation No. 694 on European defence against international terrorism, it must necessarily lead to the launch of Article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty. Until

now, the Western European Union did not need adequate military structures to implement Article V, as it could fully rely on NATO in this respect. The WEU Council has not even issued a declaration of solidarity with the decision of the North Atlantic Alliance on Article 5, it has left the U.S. alone. On October 9, 2001, the German government gave the following answer to a question posed by Klaus Bühler, chairman of the WEU Assembly: ‘According to the federal government, the NATO Council decision of September 12, 2001, had no implications for Article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty’.⁸³

Mutual obligatory transatlantic assistance could now be separated from the corresponding European involvement. If major crises affected Europe, the consequences would be significant. The answer of the German government and the ‘silence’ of the WEU Council could be interpreted as a sign that the signatories of the Modified Brussels Treaty believed that the words ‘armed attack’ used in this Treaty did not have the same meaning as in the North Atlantic Treaty. Thus, the Modified Brussels Treaty was not the equivalent of the Washington Treaty, and the reference to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty was no more than a symbol of political solidarity. Therefore, one may ask what is the specific role of military alliances and organisations in the fight against terrorism? The Danish Minister of Defence de Grave proposed the creation of a special NATO unit to combat terrorism, but no specific decisions were adopted in this regard.⁸⁴

The EU Council sketched plans to establish an appropriate intergovernmental European military and non-military crisis management. If there was no agreement among the Member States on financing certain operations from national resources, it could rely on the EU budget. In Gothenburg, the European Council called on the Belgian Presidency to work on all aspects

of CESDP so that the European Union can function efficiently in security. Fulfilling the mandate received in Göteborg in the Common European Security and Defence Policy was not easy for the Belgian Presidency for several reasons. First, the European Council undertook further specific tasks about the civilian aspects of crisis management that were to be carried out by 2003. Therefore, civilian Headline Goals have been added to the military Headline Goal, including new tasks for civilian EU capability management. Secondly, the European Council adopted the Police Action Plan, including the capabilities of non-EU countries to EU police missions, combined with civilian crisis management. It also agreed on the rules of cooperation with international organizations such as the UN, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Council of Europe in the civilian aspects of crisis management and adopted the European Union Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts. Thirdly, the Council accepted comprehensive exercises using both military and civilian resources and capabilities in the period 2001-2006. Therefore, to strengthen military capabilities, the Belgian Presidency organised a conference at the ministerial level on 19-20 November 2001 to help achieve the Headline Goal adopted in Helsinki. In December 2000, the Belgian Government agreed to undertake research work on the following issues during its presidency:

- EU operational capability and in this context its relations with NATO,
- European Union military capabilities,
- support for CESDP among public opinion,
- informing members of parliamentary assemblies,
- sketching 'European White Paper on Defence',
- health problems in the armed forces.⁸⁵

The Belgian Presidency also stated that the notified operational funds of the European Union will be able to take over WEU's ability to manage the military aspects of crises. The EU already had permanent structures designated for the preparation of relevant Council decisions, i.e., the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee (MC), and the Military Staff (MS). The Political and Security Committee was to play a key role in future European Union crisis management activities. To highlight the future crucial role of the PSC, European Council in Nice added the following two paragraphs to Article 25 of the Treaty on European Union, which reads as follows: 'The Political and Security Committee shall monitor the international situation in areas covered by the Common Foreign and Security Policy and contribute to the definition of policies by passing assessments to the Council at its request or on its initiative. It also oversees the implementation of agreed policies without prejudice to the powers of the Presidency and the Commission. Within the scope of this Title, this Committee shall exercise, under the direction of the Council, the political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations. The Council may authorize the Committee to make significant decisions regarding the political control and strategic direction of the operation for the purposes and duration of the crisis management operations specified by the Council'.

The Council decision imposed on the Political and Security Committee the task of comprehensively addressing all aspects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and CESDP and gave it a central role in the European Union's search for appropriate measures to respond to crises. From 1 July 2001, the WEU no longer dealt with such tasks. The Belgian Presidency presented an action plan aimed at correcting errors in many departments, such as strategic air transport, naval forces, air surveillance,

command and control, precision weapons, and air defence. Such an action plan should also contain proposals to strengthen intelligence cooperation, in particular blockade planning about terrorist financing.⁸⁶

What is the role of Europe in this changing world? Europe must certainly take greater responsibility for guiding globalisation processes.⁸⁷ The European Council adopted a declaration on the already functioning capabilities of the Common European Security and Defence Policy, as set out in Annex II of the Presidency Report. By continuing to develop CESDP, it was to strengthen its capabilities - both civilian and military - and to create appropriate structures within it. The Union was determined to finalise agreements with NATO quickly. They were to strengthen the European Union's capacity to conduct crisis management operations throughout the Petersberg area. The implementation of the 'Nice' also increased the Union's resources in conducting crisis management operations. The development of these means and capabilities at its disposal was to enable the Union to gradually take over more demanding operations.⁸⁸

The WEU Assembly called for greater and better coordination of European defence resources - soldiers and equipment. This became an even more urgent task because of the threat of 'extremism' of terrorism, which was revealed on September 11, 2001. Two reports from the Assembly 'Defence equipment for European crisis management' and 'European strategic lift capabilities' recommended that the Western European Union expand its activities in areas such as intelligence, deployment, and information struggle. According to Alan Meale from the United Kingdom, apart from deficiencies in the Headline Goal structure, the EU has not done much in cooperation in the field of armaments, which has influenced the

effectiveness of the Common European Security and Defence Policy. The keywords were to be cooperation and coordination.⁸⁹ The chairman of the Belgian Senate de Decker, on the other hand, said that the aftermath of the events of September 11 and the need to deal with new threats caused that emphasis was put on seeking solutions to this problem at the parliamentary level to thoroughly examine the CESDP.⁹⁰ Thus, the European Union had to discuss matters regarding the challenges of international terrorism affecting European security.⁹¹

Certainly, NATO's decision to launch Article 5 of the Washington Treaty had a fundamental impact on the nature of the Alliance and the scope of its activities, including European defence guarantees. It should be emphasised that the operation, which began on October 7, 2001, was not conducted by NATO, but by the United States of America with the involvement of the coalition of 'willingness', including European allies. One could expect a recall of the basic objectives of the involvement of European defence based on the Modified Brussels Treaty. At that time, the urgent need to extend the reach of the Petersberg mission was emphasised, which had to be revised, including appropriate measures against international terrorism. Also, there was a need to implement the Headline Goal and civilian aspects of crisis management, paying attention to the financial implications. It was proposed to share the capabilities of the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejón with the international coalition against terrorism as a European contribution to operations in Afghanistan.⁹²

The problem of coordination between internal and external security policy in the EU had two clear but closely related aspects: institutional/procedural and political. At the first level, key questions arose as to how to be more effective and transparent.⁹³ At the second level, the role of the armed forces

was considered in the fight against terrorism in general. It is about a wide range of measures ranging from protecting strategic infrastructure to including intensive warfare. The need to expand cooperation in the European context and to establish a lasting partnership with the United States of America was also emphasised. Activities in both these directions were to be reflected in the future development of the Common European Security and Defence Policy.

According to Austria, which is not in any of the military alliances - CESDP and PfP were closely related. The interoperability of units that the Austrian Armed Forces separated strengthened international operations, remained its priority. In parallel, the same level of interoperability was required within the UE Headline Goal framework. Therefore, the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) was an important link between the Partnership for Peace (PfP) cooperation and Austria's involvement in the Common European Security and Defence Policy. PARP defined important elements for a well-prepared contribution to the CESDP and the PfP North Atlantic Alliance program and in helping to avoid duplication of planning efforts.⁹⁴ Although the WEU Secretary-General Javier Solana has often said that CESDP was developed 'at the speed of light', it did not play a significant role in the campaign against international terrorism and military operations in Afghanistan. However, there were doubts as to whether the European Union would be 'fit' in this area. The campaign against the Taliban regime was based on coordination between the United States of America and a coalition of individual governments.

What could be done to avoid jeopardising the CESDP project and European strategic autonomy? The European Union is of course a serious and more comprehensive undertaking. However, it is important for the European Union that become a

credible actor in military crisis management. The main problem was not the ratification of the Treaty of Nice, although it was important for the implementation of the decisions taken since the Cologne Summit in 1996. For the many EU Member States, the Union was primarily a peaceful civilian force, which in its activities emphasised protection against crises and crisis management primarily through political means.

The development of European strategic autonomy will be another of the many instruments through which the EU can achieve its political goals. Such a 'comprehensive' approach will be beneficial if there are rapid inter-institutional coordination and rapid prioritisation by policymakers. The allocation of necessary financial resources is closely related to the indication of these priorities. Due to the different attitudes of the Member States and the rivalry between the community and intergovernmental institutions, the decision-making process does not run smoothly. It seems that as soon as the Common European Security and Defence Policy begin to function, the issue of making quick decisions within the EU will be crucial for building European strategic autonomy. Americans have helped to point out to Europeans the weaknesses of the European Union in certain areas and to convince Europeans that a common policy is urgently needed to prevent threats and protect their countries. What seemed impossible often became necessary. Closer police cooperation and more effective judicial cooperation proposed by the European Union were now to become a practice. Global terrorism revealed in the events of September 11, 2001, also obliged European democracies to regain cohesion, forced Europeans to revise their common view of the Union, and recalled that the European Union is a political cooperation undertaking aimed at European strategic autonomy.⁹⁵

Notes

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² *Przeciw terroryzmowi*, “Polska Zbrojna”, 30 June 1993.

³ R. Bierzanek, J. Symonides, *Prawo międzynarodowe publiczne*, Warszawa 1999, p. 392.

⁴ *Resolution 1368 (2001) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4370th meeting, on 12 September 2001.*

⁵ *Resolution 1373 (2001) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th meeting, on 28 September 2001.*

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²¹ *Speech by Mrs Nicole Fontaine*, President of the European Parliament at the opening of the Ghent European Council, Ghent, 19 October 2001.

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²⁴ G.W. Bush, *Coalition Partners 'Must Perform'*, Office of the Press Secretary, November 6, 2001.

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²⁶ *Remarks of Secretary Colin L. Powell with NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson after their Meeting*, Washington, October 10, 2001.

²⁷ *Statement by NATO Secretary-General, Lord Robertson*, 8 October 2001.

²⁸ *European Union, Luxembourg, October 8, 2001, Statement by General Affairs Council.*

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CONCLUSION

The U.S. foreign policy direction is set by the economy and rich, influential economic interest groups that are closely related to government elites. The economic circles, especially defence companies, wanted to spread fear of the Soviet Union's invasion of Western Europe, the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance, and the enlargement of this Alliance. They also wanted to achieve limited European strategic autonomy, only if it is in line with the American concept.

The supremacy of the United States of America in Western Europe after World War II was accomplished at the request and largely by the hands of Europeans themselves: from the work of many European scientists for the United States of America on atom, rocket, and penetration of space to the creation of tools for implementing American policy, such as the International Monetary Fund, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and finally the North Atlantic Alliance, which was then institutionalised in the form of NATO. Western European countries have rebuilt their economies and armed forces and have also integrated their societies based on the United States of America model.

The creation of alliances is one of the methods by which countries strive to achieve a favourable balance of power in international relations. This was also the case with the establishment of the North Atlantic Alliance. This alliance provided legal and international foundations for the American presence in Europe. The United States of America, with the assistance of allied states, formed a balance of power following their interests. Thanks to the North Atlantic Alliance, the Americans were able to interfere in the internal affairs of

European countries and use it as an instrument to realise their interests.

NATO's adaptation to the new international conditions that emerged after the collapse of the block system was intended to maintain U.S. leadership in Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was used as a means of European integration, proclaiming the concept of New Europe and New Atlantis. Through the idea of a united and free Europe, Americans associated the countries of Central and Eastern Europe with the interests of the United States of America. Evidence of this was the inclusion of three countries of the region in the North Atlantic Alliance. Decisions to expand the Alliance are not only the result of lobbying pressure. But also, a means to maintain U.S. influence in Europe and the necessary instrument to revive the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. For the United States of America, the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance was also a guarantee that new members of the European Union would also be loyal U.S. allies. The goal of the United States of America was also to use the Alliance to defend its global interests. To enable these goals, the Americans inspired the idea of building the New Atlantic Community. All these goals were implemented by American diplomacy very active in Europe, extremely broad economic involvement, and the American armed forces stationed in Europe. All strategically engaged, not only in the political and military sphere but also in economic intelligence services.

In the emergence of the strong rival with the euro to limit the importance of the dollar in the global economy, the main problem for Americans was finding the answer to the question of how to maintain influence in Europe. The European Security and Defence Identity in the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance as part of a broader transatlantic project was intended to be a contribution to the solution of this problem. By implementing the

American concept of 'European strategic autonomy', the United States of America was to maintain political influence in EU countries.

The supremacy of the United States of America after World War II allowed for the creation of an alliance in line with their interests. The Alliance ensured the durability of American supremacy. Given the above, the following conclusions can be drawn:

- The United States of America has secured its supremacy in Europe and the world with the 'hands' of Europeans themselves.
- The North Atlantic Alliance created under the influence of lofty ideas, then institutionalised in the form of NATO, became an instrument of implementing American policy in Europe, making the United States of America a participant in internal European affairs.
- The United States of America has always made sure that European interests in the world are realised under their control.
- The new situation in Europe has modified the role of the North Atlantic Alliance. The United States of America proclaiming the slogan of a single and free Europe connected Central European countries with American interests. The new ambitions of the European Community the USA tried to use to create the system of New Europe, in accordance with its strategic interests, maintaining the global role of its armed forces.
- The process of internal transformation of the Alliance and the process of its Europeanisation is aimed at maintaining the U.S.'s influence in Europe.
- The United States of America is heading towards the North Atlantic Alliance going beyond the traditional area of responsibility, caring for U.S. interests on a global scale.

- American military forces and intelligence services in Europe have been instruments to ensure USA global leadership.
- The enlargement of the Alliance was an instrument of U.S. policy that allowed to maintain influence in Europe, revive NATO, provide the Atlantic option by the then candidates for EU membership, and maintain the presence of the USA in Europe.
- The events of September 11, 2001 have strengthened the American vision of influencing international actors, and at the same time deepened Europeans' awareness of the need to have their defence capabilities, and to accelerate the process of European strategic autonomy.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AAMS	Anti-Air Missile System
AAFA	Allied Air Forces
AAFCE	Allied Air Forces Central Europe
AAFNE	Allied Air Forces Northern Europe
AAFSE	Allied Air Forces Southern Europe
ACCS	Army Command and Control System
ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ACE	Allied Command Europe
ACLANT	Allied Command, Atlantic
AE	Army in Europe
AFCENT	Allied Forces Central Europe
AFNORTH	Allied Forces, Northern Europe
AFNORTH-WEST	Allied Forces Northwest Europe
AFSOUTH	Allied Forces Southern Europe
AGS	Airborne Ground Surveillance System
AIRCENT	Allied Air Forces Central Europe
AIRNORTH-WEST	Allied Air Forces North-Western Europe

ABBREVIATIONS

AIRSOUTH	Allied Air Forces Southern Europe
AMF	ACE Mobile Force
AMF (A)	ACE Mobile Air Force
AMF (L)	ACE Mobile Land Force
AOI	Area of Interest
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APC	Atlantic Partnership Council
APAG	Atlantic Policy Advisory Group
ARFPS	ACE Reaction Forces Planning Staff
ARRC	ACE Rapid Reaction Corps
ATAF	Allied Tactical Air Force
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
AWEU	Assembly of Western European Union
BTWC	Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
3C	Contact, Co-operation, Confidence
C2	Command and Control
C3	Consultation, Command and Control
C3I	Communication, Command, Control, and Information
CANUS	Canada - United States

ABBREVIATIONS

CBM	Confidence Building Measure
CDE	Conference on Security and Confidence Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe
CEAC	Committee for European Airspace Coordination
CEDP	Common European Defence Policy
CENTAG	Central Army Group
CESDP	Common European Security and Defence Policy
CFE	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CFE-1A	Concluding Act of the Negotiations on Personnel Strength of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CI	Counterintelligence
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIG	Central Intelligence Group
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CINCENT	Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe
CINCSOUTH	Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe
CIP	Common Intelligence Policy

ABBREVIATIONS

CIS	Communications and Information Systems
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Forces
CNAD	Conference of National Armaments Directors
COMAIRCENT	Commander Allied Air Forces Central Europe
COMLANDCENT	Commander Allied Land Forces Central Europe
CUSRPG	Canada-US Regional Planning Group
3xD	no duplication, no decoupling, no discrimination
DCI	Defence Capability Initiative
DERA	Defence Evaluation and Research Agency
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DoS	Department of State
DPC	Defence Planning Committee
DPQ	Defence Planning Questionnaire
DSACEUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
EAA	European Armaments Agency
EADC	European Aerospace and Defence Company
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

ABBREVIATIONS

EAPC-SC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Steering Committee
EFA	European Fighter Aircraft
ESA	European Space Agency
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
ESDP	European Security and Deference Policy
EUCOM US	European Command
FAWEU	Forces Answerable to the Western European Union
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GCHQ	Government Communication Headquarters
GSE	Le Groupe Stratégique Européenne
HLG	High-Level Group
HLSG	High-Level Steering Group
HQ	Headquarters -
IEPG	Independent European Programme Group
IMS	International Military Staff
IPP	Individual partnership Programme
IRF	Immediate Reaction Forces
IS	International Staff

ABBREVIATIONS

JACO	Joint Armaments Cooperation Organisation
JACS	Joint Armaments Cooperation Structure
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
JSRC	Joint Sub-regional Command
LANDCENT	Allied Land Forces Central Europe
LANDSOUTH	Allied Land Forces Southern Europe
LANDSOUTHCENT	Allied Land Forces South Central Europe
LANDSOUTHEAST	Allied Land Forces South-Eastern Europe
MAP	Membership Action Plan
MC	Military Committee
MCG	Mediterranean cooperation Group
MDF	Main Defence Forces
MS	Military Staff
NAA	North Atlantic Assembly
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NAPR	NATO Armaments Planning Review

ABBREVIATIONS

NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NAVNORTHWEST	Allied Naval Forces North-Western Europe
NAVSOUTH	Allied Naval Southern Europe
NC3B	NATO Consultation, Command and Control Board
NCCIS NATO	Command, Control, and Information System
NORAD	North American Air Defence System
NORTHAG	Northern Army Group Central Europe
NPA	NATO Parliamentary Assembly
NPG	Nuclear Planning Group
NRO	National Reconnaissance Office
NSA	National Security Agency
NSIP	NATO Security Investment Programme
NUC	NATO-Ukraine Commission
OCCAR	Organisme Conjoint de Cooperation en Matière d'Armement
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSS	Office of Strategic Services

ABBREVIATIONS

OTAN	Organisation du Traite de l'Atlantique Nord
PAPS	Periodic Armaments Planning System
PARP	Planning and Review Process
PC	Political Committee
PCC	Partnership Coordination Cell
PCG	Policy Coordination Group
PERM REP	Permanent Representative (to the NAC)
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PJC NATO – Russia	Permanent Joint Council - NATO – Russia
PMSC	Political-Military Steering Committee on Partnership for Peace
PMSC/AHG	Political-Military Steering Committee/ Ad Hoc Group Peacekeeping
PSC	Political Security Committee
RC	Regional Command
R&D	Research and Development
RRF	Rapid Reaction Force
R&T	Research and Technology
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe

ABBREVIATIONS

SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
S.C.	Strategic Command
SDI	Strategic Defence Initiative
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SG	Secretary-General
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SLG	Senior Level Group
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SPC	Senior Political Committee
STRIK-FLTLANT	Strike Fleet Atlantic
STRIKFOR-SOUTH	Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe
USAF	US Air Force
USEUCOM	United States European Command
WEAG	Western European Armaments Group
WEAO	Western European Armaments Organisation
WESTLANT	Western Atlantic Area
WEU	Western European Union

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REVIEWS

The research of Professor Adam Krzymowski refers to an extremely important and very current problem in Euro-Atlantic relations, which is developing the strategic autonomy of the European Communities, and the European Union itself. The book is pioneering research on the publishing market because it has undoubtedly high cognitive and substantive value. Undoubtedly, the author is a high-class specialist, freely moving in the field of security policy in the studied area and with extensive scientific and practical achievements, ensuring a high methodological level of the publication. The work is an important source of knowledge about the key problems of European security in the Euro-Atlantic context. The publication is the result of the author's extensive original and innovative research.

Professor Krzysztof Miszczak

Head of International Security Unit - Warsaw School of Economics

The presented book for review, undertakes fascinating issues, both from a historical and prospective point of view, drawing the reader into the matters of the most crucial level, concerning security and defence, in a way that is interesting for professionals, as well as a large group of security enthusiasts. This should not come as a surprise, because the author is an outstanding expert on the issues raised. Professor Adam KRZYMOWSKI participated in the most important processes of Polish foreign policy related to Poland's accession to the European Union, and membership in NATO. He participated in many decision-making bodies and participated in conferences and multilateral diplomacy forums. As an advisor to the Prime Minister of Poland, he had knowledge that he was able to implement into effective decisions. His knowledge, experience, and inspiration allowed him to transfer these values in this monograph.

General, Professor Mieczyslaw Bieniek

NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (ret.)



Professor Adam Krzymowski participated in the most significant strategic processes concerning Poland's foreign policy and international dialogue.

From 1999 to 2008, Professor Krzymowski worked in the Office of the Committee for European Integration. In 2008, he represented his country in the first governmental parliamentary delegation to the European Space Agency in Paris, leading Poland to join that organisation.

From 2008 to 2011 Professor Krzymowski worked in Poland's Prime Minister's Office as a Counsellor to the Prime Minister, responsible for monitoring global processes, managing international dialogue, advising on EU policies and the Middle East.

From February 2011 to August 2015, he was the Ambassador of Poland in the UAE, transforming the relationship from a low to a strategic level. Professor Krzymowski represented Poland at the International Renewable Energy Agency. During the second half of 2011, he was the European Union Representative in the UAE. In the same year, he participated in the EU-GCC Joint Council, and in the International Contact Group for Libya. In 2012, he headed the Polish delegation to the first meeting of the International Working Group on Economic Recovery and Development of the Friends of the Syrian People. In the same year, he participated in the International Contact Group on Afghanistan. In 2013, he was the head of the Polish delegation at the meeting of the Proliferation Security Initiative. In 2014, he represented Poland at the International Conference on Countering Piracy. In 2015, he was the head of the Polish delegation at the International Contact Group on Afghanistan.

After his Ambassador's mission, he was researching at the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. In early 2016, Professor Krzymowski assumed the post of Senior Advisor to the UAE Minister of State for International Cooperation responsible for Expo 2020 Dubai.

Professor Adam Krzymowski is the Board of Trustees member of the Strategic Advisory Center for Economic and Future Studies in Abu Dhabi. From the start of his career, Professor Krzymowski has combined his academic practice with work in government administration and diplomacy. As Professor, he has been delivering lectures at various universities including Sorbonne University, New York University in Abu Dhabi, and currently at Zayed University. Professor Krzymowski is also a prolific author of scholarly publications on a variety of contemporary topics related to regional and global security policy issues, sustainable development challenges as well as global governance and diplomacy in the new emerging global era.